Dialogue January - March, 2006 , Volume 7 No. 3
Peace Initiatives in the Northeast
Insurgency
would appear to be the hallmark of half the States of the Northeast. Insurgency
has plagued Nagaland for as long as one can remember. Moves to turn Nagaland
into a sovereign State and to break away from India got under way even before
the new State was carved out of Assam in January 1963. Naga leaders like Angami
Zapu Phizo of the Naga National Council (NNC) sought asylum in Britain and
carried on the movement for an independent country for the Nagas from there.
Today, the Izak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)
is without question the most powerful insurgent group of the Northeast. Long
before the split with the Khaplang faction of the NSCN, the outfit was Big
Brother to most other insurgent outfits of the region, helping them with arms,
training and asylum whenever needed. The NSCN (I-M) is able to collect monthly
‘taxes’ from all government officers of Nagaland in order to fund all its
activities and much of the purchase of arms, though the government continues to
pretend that none of this is happening. But more about insurgency in Nagaland at
the proper place.
Close on the heels of insurgency
in Nagaland, the Mizo National Front (MNF) led by Laldenga too sought to
establish a sovereign state. The MNF emerged as a regional political party out
of the Mizo Famine Front, which had been formed by Laldenga to protest the
inaction of the Union Government towards the famine situation in the Mizo areas
of Assam in 1959. Laldenga and the MNF cadres went underground and into the
forests to carry on the struggle for many years. Finally, a peace agreement was
signed between the Union Government and the MNF in 1986, and Mizoram was created
as a separate State within the Indian Union. An MNF government with Laldenga at
its head came to power in the newly created State of Mizoram. Since then Mizoram
has been completely free from insurgency, even though the MNF lost the first
elections following the peace agreement. Like Nagaland and Mizoram of
yesteryears, Manipur too is in the grip of insurgency. Extortion is an everyday
affair, and as in Nagaland, no government officer, trader, or contractor can
hope to survive without paying a monthly ‘tax’, which goes to the
underground. So it is in Tripura, which probably has the largest number of
abductions for ransom in the region every year. However, this article confines
itself to Nagaland and Assam where the peace process is most visible now.
Assam was free from insurgency,
until the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) came into being. In fact, the
ULFA came into being as the militant wing of the All Assam Students Union (AASU)
that was spearheading the Assam Movement against large-scale illegal immigration
from Bangladesh and the enfranchisement of these foreigners. The Assam Movement
was started in the year 1979 – the year ULFA came into being. In the
beginning, the ULFA too was committed to the three D’s: detection,
disfranchisement and deportation of the illegal migrants from Bangladesh. It is
ironical that today the top echelon of the ULFA leadership should be operating
from Bangladesh or that they should have succeeded in securing asylum and
training camp facilities in that country. In any case, by about 1983 the ULFA
had very little to do with the non-violent movement of the AASU, and broke
completely free of the latter. It proclaimed its struggle for a sovereign Assam
to be administered on the principles of “scientific socialism”. The ULFA
started extortion of money from those it believed had money to spare. It
kidnapped tea garden executives for ransom, killing one or two to send out the
message that people would be better off paying up. It killed a Russian oil
technologist and people like Manabendra Sarma of the Congress in broad daylight.
At the Lakhipathar killings, the outfit demonstrated that it could be public
prosecutor, judge and executioner all rolled into one. In no time at all the
ULFA got metamorphosed from an insurgent group into a terrorist outfit. It began
picking soft targets, and on August 15, 2004, the ULFA gunned down people who
had gathered to witness the Independence Day parade at Dhemaji. Several innocent
women and children were killed.
Meanwhile, the ULFA had been
declared a banned outfit. That was when it moved to Bhutan and Bangladesh. In
1991, when the Congress came back to power in Assam, the then Chief Minister
Hiteswar Saikia, offered general amnesty to all ULFA cadres who were willing to
lay down arms. Many of the senior ULFA cadres who offered to surrender just
handed over one weapon retaining most others. They have thus managed to
terrorize people and get just what they want all these years merely because they
are better armed than the custodians of the law. In this way, a second
Frankenstein monster has been spawned from the first one. Quite often, this
group of ULFA activists who surrendered at that time (called the SULFA) are able
to determine who shall get a contract of the Public Works Department or the
Public Health Engineering Department and who shall not. They have full control
even over the distribution of tender forms. Quite often they make it impossible
for anyone to sell property unless they have been given a cut.
One of the worst things to have
happened to the ULFA was its senior leaders coming under the spell of
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and managing to get trained by
the ISI in Pakistan while they were in Bangladesh. They were flown to Islamabad
by Pakistan International Airways on fake passports issued by Bangladesh,
trained by the ISI in Pakistan and returned to Bangladesh. Now they are entirely
under the control of the ISI.
Fortunately, four States of the
Northeast – Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Sikkim – are free from
the scourge of insurgency. However, almost the entire Northeast seems to have a
low flash point as far as insurgency is concerned, and it may not be long before
other States too get drawn into the whirlpool. One sees insurgency as a scourge
because it is so easy for insurgent outfits to cross the very thin line that
separates insurgency from terrorism. This has happened on a number of occasions
not only in the case of the better-known insurgent groups, but also in the
recent clashes between Dimasas and Karbis that has led to the killing of
innocent people (dragged out of buses) in the most savage manner.
Peace initiatives
The most noteworthy peace
initiatives of the Union Government (after the successful initiatives against
the Mizo National Front) have been the initiatives with the Izak-Muivah faction
of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, generally referred to as the NSCN
(I-M). The need for a return to peace and for negotiations with the Government
of India was something that the Naga civil society, the church and the Naga Hoho
-– the supreme civil body of the Nagas -– has sought to emphasize over the
years. The fact that the Nagas have participated in elections conducted by the
Government of India through its Election Commission over the years has not been
lost on anyone. Nor has the fact that astronomical amounts have been received by
the Nagaland Government from the Centre as development grants over the years. If
the suppliers of goods and services have siphoned vast sums out, the Nagas have
only their own leaders and officers to blame. Be that as it may, the Naga civil
society was eventually able to persuade the main insurgent outfit to sit down
for talks. To that end, a mutually accepted ceasefire has been in force in
Nagaland since August 1, 1997. This ceasefire has been extended for a year at a
time, but on the last occasion the NSCN (I-M) agreed to extend it only for six
months. As such, the ceasefire is due to expire on January 31, 2006.
Several rounds of the Government
of India’s peace talks with the NSCN (I-M) have been held outside the country
in venues like Amsterdam and Bangkok, with only one round of talks being held in
New Delhi. While most of the other differences appear to have been resolved, one
major sticking point has been the NSCN (I-M) demand that all Naga inhabited
territory of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh must also be annexed to the
present Nagaland to create what will be known as a greater Nagalim. Even the
Nagaland Government has endorsed this stand of the NSCN (I-M) by adopting two
resolutions in the Nagaland Assembly to this effect. However, such a proposal
cannot be acceptable to Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. These States stand
to lose huge chunks of territory to Nagaland if the Centre concedes this
unreasonable demand. In fact, hardly anything of Manipur would remain if the
Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur were to be annexed to Nagaland. The NSCN (I-M)
is adamant about this demand, and Muivah has threatened to take to the forests
and to resume violent measures if this demand is not met. That is why the
extension of the ceasefire has been for a period of six months this time and not
for a year.
There is no gainsaying that as
things are now, the Naga peace talks are not headed towards a happy conclusion.
The demand for the integration of all Naga-inhabited territory (of other States
as well) into a greater Nagalim is an unreasonable one, and cannot be accepted
by the people of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. And yet there is a
lurking fear among the people of Assam and Manipur that the Centre could find it
more fashionable and ‘secular’ to concede the demand of a Christian tribal
population rather than doing justice to the Assamese and Meitei Hindus of
Manipur. After all, the Centre is anxious to be able to take credit for solving
the Naga imbroglio after all these years, regardless of the cost to other States
of the Union. However, the NSCN (I-M) is not going to find it very easy to just
walk out of the peace talks and return to the forests with their arms. The Naga
Mothers Association, the Naga Hoho and the Naga Students’ Federation have all
made it clear that the NSCN (I-M) should not pull out of the talks, and that the
dialogue with the Centre must continue. Meanwhile, Mr Oscar Fernandes, who is
now the Centre’s representative for the peace talks, has fallen out of favour
with a lot of people in Nagaland for having used up all his time on a recent
trip to the State in meeting just his party men. He is now desperate to make
amends by meeting the NSCN (I-M) leadership at Bangkok and to persuade them not
to take any precipitate action. He is also understood to be putting pressure on
the Centre to arrive at a settlement that could well amount to his taking the
easy way out by endorsing the integration of all Naga-dominated areas to form a
greater Nagalim. If he looks for such easy solutions at the cost of other
States, he would be responsible for creating more problems in the Northeast than
he might solve. He would do well to respect the sentiments and aspirations of
other States with a much bigger population than Nagaland’s.
The other problem in the Naga
peace talks arises from the fact that the NSCN (I-M) still nurses the hope of
being accorded the status of a sovereign state. Quite obviously, the Centre
cannot be expected to preside over the liquidation of India. Besides, why should
any country subsidize attempts by constituent States to break away from the
Union? As such, the middle course would be a greater level of autonomy for
Nagaland. One does not expect the NSCN (I-M) to take kindly to such a via media.
Yet the NSCN (I-M) itself is under pressure from the civil society in Nagaland,
and it is unlikely to take any precipitate steps that could undo the good work
of the last eight years beginning with the ceasefire and progressing to the
peace talks. It is evident that the people of Nagaland have had more decades of
strife and lack of development than is good for any society, and the NSCN (I-M)
is unlikely to go against the will of the people. Perhaps that is why the
Nagaland Assembly was persuaded to adopt not one but two resolutions on the
integration of all Naga-inhabited areas neighbouring States in the proposed
greater Nagalim. The NSCN (I-M) needs greater insurance against adverse public
opinion. As such, though the outfit is doing everything possible to put pressure
on the Centre, it seems unlikely that it will take any precipitate action that
could jeopardize the future of the peace talks. It is now much more accountable
to the people.
As for the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA), its blow-hot-blow- cold approach to talks with the Centre
has considerably delayed the peace process in Assam. In the past, there have
been quite a few occasions when the ULFA has sent out signals to indicate that
it is willing to have talks, and sought a ceasefire. There have been occasions
when the ULFA has taken advantage of a unilateral ceasefire to violate the terms
of the ceasefire. There have also been other occasions when the Assam Government
itself has announced a unilateral ceasefire during the Assamese New Year and the
Magh Bihu to enable ULFA cadres to visit their families. Even this seems to have
cut no ice with the ULFA top brass.
The ULFA has had other problems
as well. One has been the dwindling public support for the outfit. The other is
having to abandon the safe haven of Bhutan after many years of forcible stay in
the mountain kingdom. The military action of Bhutan threw out the ULFA cadres
from their camps there along with their families. Ever since, the outfit has
been scurrying from one neighbouring State to another in search of shelter. It
is all very well for the ULFA to claim that it has continued to recruit more
young men to its cadres in recent times. This does not prove anything in a State
that has about the highest unemployment rate in the world. There is no dearth of
school and college dropouts who have also seen that there is more money to be
made through extortion as a member of an insurgent outfit than they can ever
hope to make with their lack of qualifications and skills. Besides, they have
also seen the lifestyle of the SULFA men. The equation for Assam seems to be
very clear for them: there are all kinds of economic packages for young men who
pick up arms and then surrender. There is none for those who never picked
up arms at all. This is a bizarre socio-political equation, but that is how
things are. This is mainly because insurgency had been turned into a cottage
industry in Assam, and has now been elevated to the level of a medium-scale
industry. Insurgency has its beneficiaries throughout the entire spectrum of our
society – politicians, bureaucrats, petty officials, industrialists,
businessmen, journalists and student leaders. This is a vested interest that is
loath to let peace return to the State. This is bound to happen in those
backward regions that are witness to development at a much higher pace elsewhere
in the country than in their own region. If the disparity continues for too
long, the reasons cease to matter. Turning insurgency itself into an industry is
bound to be the inevitable consequence.
Be that as it may, some time ago
Dr Indira Goswami (also known as Mamoni Raisom Goswami), recipient of the
Jnanpith Award and Professor Emeritus of Delhi University, offered to negotiate
with the ULFA and bring the banned outfit to the negotiating table. After some
initial hiccups over whether the issue of sovereignty of Assam would figure on
the agenda or not, the Centre accepted Dr Goswami as a negotiator, and the ULFA
was happy to have her mediating for the outfit. The ULFA then nominated a
People’s Consultative Group to initiate the preliminary discussions with the
Centre. This group had the first round of discussions in New Delhi, and seems
quite happy with the outcome. However, the ULFA is now looking forward to
political-level talks right from the beginning, since there are some serious
problems that the ULFA faces. One stems from the counter-insurgency measures in
Assam that have been intensified lately despite the beginning of peace
initiatives. What has naturally irked the ULFA is that the killing of ULFA
cadres should go on despite the beginning of the initiatives for peace. This
also seems rather strange to the ULFA top brass, considering that the
administration in Assam has a unified command structure, with the armed forces
collaborating closely with the civil administration in counter-insurgency
operations. Given such a situation, it was reasonable to expect that the
counter-insurgency measures would be held in abeyance during peace process. In
fact, the failure to ensure this makes people wonder whether one hand of the
government does not know or does not give due importance to what the other is
doing. And it is not as though Assam does not have its share of state terrorism.
After all, we continue to have fake encounters in the State with some innocent
persons being shot down by the security forces on charges of being armed
insurgents. Another problem is that there is now a group claiming to be a
faction of the ULFA that says it is opposed to the talks with the Centre. The
ULFA claims that there is no such group, but the group itself insists that it is
part of the ULFA. Finally, there is some legitimate concern within the ULFA that
leaving the negotiations to bureaucrats alone is bound to slow down the peace
initiative considerably. The ULFA top brass has learnt what to expect from a
close monitoring of the Centre’s peace process with the NSCN (I-M). The Naga
peace talks have often got bogged just because they were left to the
bureaucrats. The ULFA knows that time is running out for it. It no longer has
the public support it once commanded. Worse still, a lot of people are beginning
to ask the vital question about the difference between an insurgent group and a
terrorist outfit when the ULFA has had no qualms about gunning down innocent
women and children participating in Independence Day celebrations. The coming
days will probably see major concessions having to be made by the ULFA to arrive
at an honourable settlement with the Centre, if some ULFA bigwigs are also
hoping to contest the Assembly elections in the State early next year. It is
unlikely that the Centre will agree to sovereignty either in the case of
Nagaland or Assam.
Dialogue (A quarterly journal of Astha Bharati) |