B.B. Kumar

The Chinese invasion of India in October-November 1962 left India thoroughly humiliated and the then Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru physically and psychologically broken and disillusioned. Nehru asked one of the most eminent Europe and America’s China experts: "Tell me, why have the Chinese done this to me?" The reply was some thing like this: "They have done this to show you that you are dirt, that you are negligible, that they are all powerful and you are nothing."1 Needless to say that the invasion was to teach India a lesson, as the Chinese did to Vietnam later in February 1979. The then Supreme Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping arrogantly boasted that his country was teaching Vietnam a lesson.

Morality did not come in the way of the strategy of Mao. While Nehru was promoting China in Bandung, Zhou Enlai indulged in backstage intrigue against India with his Pakistan counterpart Mohammed Ali. He assured him that Pakistan’s membership of US-sponsored military pacts were no hurdles to a close relationship with China.2

"We might well bear in mind that, at present everybody in Asia is engaged in a game of grab - even the chief victim (China), and if in the future anyone who has suffered from this policy is in a position to retaliate, he is likely to do so without discrimination. This being so, it would be wise to make our Indian frontier as secure as possible now, before the storm comes, and for that reason Great Britain can never afford to see China take Tibet... it would be of great advantage to us to place a friendly and possibly a formidable buffer state between the two empires, since it is the Tibetan Plateau, not the Himalayas, which form the real northern frontier of India. That is to say, we should uphold the status quo as it was a year ago after the (Chinese) revolution (of 1911) and if China does not agree, fight with her for the possession to Tibet since it would be easier to wage an aggressive war now than it will be to carry on a defensive one 10 or 15 years hence ... Mongolia has virtually perished - Tibet follows unless Great Britain signs her charter of freedom; and it requires no foresight to see what that implies. It will be the cheapest way in the end."3

One stele was erected at Gungu Meru in the extreme East to demarcate the borders between Tibet and China, the second in Lhasa and the third in Chinese capital of Chang’an. It also needs mention here that’the Tibetans were the dominating power in Tarim Basin at least from the middle of the eighth until the middle of the ninth century".4 Tarim basin is present day Chinese Turkistan.

The Manchus incorporated China into their empire by overthrowing the Ming dynasty. The new rulers of China belonged to the Qing dynasty (1639-1911). The fifth Dalai Lama became the most powerful ruler of Tibet in 1642 with the backing of his Mongol patron Gushri Khan. Regarded as a ‘Supreme Sovereign (Gongsa Chenpo) by the Tibetans, he maintained good relationship with both the Mongols and the Manchus. In 1639, he sent his envoy to the court of Qing Emperor Tai Tsung. Following Chinese Emperor Sbunzi’s invitation to the fifth Dalai Lama for a state visit to his imperial capital in 1653, the 5th Dalai Lama visited the same. The Tibetan sovereign and spiritual leader was accorded unprecedented respect during that visit, as recorded by W.W. Rockhill:

"(The Dalai Lama) had been treated with all the ceremony which could have been accorded to any independent sovereign, and nothing could be found in Chinese works to indicate that he was looked upon in any other light. At this period of China’s relations with Tibet, the temporal power of the Lama, backed by the arms of Gusri Khan and devotion of all Mongolia, was not a thing for the emperor of China to question."5

"The Emperor issued detailed instructions to me, the Great General, to discuss all the points, one by one, in great length. This demonstrates Emperor’s concern that Tibetans come to no harm and that their welfare be ensured in perpetuity. There is no doubt that the Dalai Lama, acknowledging his gratitude to the Emperor, will accept these suggestions once all the points are discussed and agreed upon. However, if the Tibetans cling on their age-old habits, the Emperor will withdraw the Ambans and the garrisons after the troops are pulled out. Moreover, if similar incidents occur in future, the Emperor will have nothing to do with them. The Tibetans may, therefore, decide for themselves as to what is in their favour and what is not, or what is heavy and what is light, and make a choice on their own."6

The beginning of the 20th century proved not auspicious for Tibet. It became a helpless pawn in the great colonial game in which Britain, Russia and China were the players. The game had rather started before the end of 19th century. The British, unable to deal with Tibet independently and fearing Russian infiltration there, concluded two treaties with China in 1890 and 1893 without the participation and knowledge of Tibet although the same had provisions regarding Tibet. Naturally, the government of Tibet rejected them. This led to British invasion of Tibet in 1903 under Colonel Younghusband’s command. The Chinese government did not fulfill its obligations towards Tibet under Choe-Yon relationship and Amban Yu Tai held the Tibetans responsible for the invasion. The Younghusband expedition was withdrawn from Lhasa after a treaty, also known as the ‘Lhasa Convention’, with the Tibetan government that gave implicit recognition to Tibet’s unrestricted sovereignty in internal and external matters. China was not a party to the treaty; rather it was a foreign power for Tibet as per the terms of the 1904 Convention Para (d) of the Article IX of the convention, which reads:

The Younghusband expedition destroyed the military strength of Tibet and exposed its inner weaknesses. At the same time, China witnessed vacillation of Great Britain. Moreover, Tibet developed inner conflict. Relations between Lhasa and Kham were not smooth. Incidentally, the Khampas exhibited the same contempt for Lhasa even in 1950 after four decades, which helped China to "liberate" Tibet smoothly. Under such circumstances China decided upon a new Tibet policy. General Zhao Erfeng, the Chinese warlord and Governor of Sinning, was appointed the new Army Commander for Tibet. Zhao (known in Tibet as Butcher Zhao) started advancing in the Tibetan territory as soon as Younghusband departed from the plateau. His brother Zhao Erxun was responsible for Sichuan. The Zhao brothers aimed to integrate Tibet into the Chinese empire. They began by dividing Tibet into different administrative divisions; Amdo became the new administrative province of Qinghai. Parts of it were integrated into South of Gansu and northwest of Sichuan. Kham became Xikang, Zhao invaded Kham in 1905. He began meticulously "razing monasteries, killing monks and beheading Tibetan officials, who were immediately replaced by Chinese officers in his effort to cinicize Kham."7 As French explorer Jacques Bacot has described: "Zhao was a truly terrible man, extraordinarily energetic and hard; he could coldly do things, after reflection, which would surprise us even when we knew that he was a maniac of cruelty."8 As Charles Bell has written: "The memory of Chao Erfeng’s (Zhao Erfeng) ruthless invasion in Eastern Tibet, his destruction of the monasteries and killing of monks has established a memory of bitterness that is still alive in Tibet"9 While the Empress continued to reassure Dalai Lama, the ground situation was just the opposite. Slight protests or old grudge resulted in mass killings. As many as 1,210 monks and laymen were butchered in Chating, and-more than 300 in Bating. Even the Dalai Lama was sacked. The Tibetan government sent an emissary to Calcutta with a request for sending a telegram to Beijing as the Amban did not forward their case earlier to Beijing. The Tibetan government treaded cautiously as the Dalai Lama was still in China. When he arrived, the news of arrival of the Manchu army led him to decide to seek political asylum in India. (Similarly, 50 years later, the 14th Dalai Lama had to flee to India after PLA’s invasion of Tibet.) There was unprecedented revolt and uprising in Tibet against the Chinese, who were ousted from Tibet. The 13th Dalai Lama left Kalimpong for Tibet in June 1912. Tibet remained free for nearly 40 years till it was recaptured by the Chinese army.

Simla Convention was held between Great Britain, China and Tibet in 1914. In the convention, "Tibetans had come so well prepared with volumes and volumes of original documents, while Chinese had no documents to prove their allegations"10 The meeting was not fruitful due to the delaying tactics of the Chinese delegates. As Hugh Richardson has observed: "It was to ensure the reality of Tibetan autonomy but still to leave the Chinese with a position of sufficient dignity." In an agreement signed on April 27, China pledged not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province; on the other hand, Great Britain was not to annex any portion of the country. The boundary between Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA) was initialed by British and Tibetan representatives, to which McMahon gave his name. The problem cropped up as China did not want to surrender newly conquered areas of Kham (Eastern Tibet) by Zhao Erfeng, while Tibet insisted on them. The final document, of course, was signed on July 3, 1914 only by Great Britain and Tibet.

"Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. In 1950, there was a people and a territory, and a government that functioned in that territory, conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside authority. From 1913-1950, foreign relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of Tibet, and countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet in practice as an independent State."11

Chinese suzerainty claim over Tibet rests on the assertion that the area was conquered by the Mongol rulers of China. Basing on such queer logic, any country of the world may claim suzerainty over the other. For example, Greece over Iran, Afghanistan and parts of India and Central Asia; and Mongolia over China, Central Asia and parts of West Asia; and so on. (Arpi, p. 265) Moreover, for Tibet, the relationship was based on the personal relationship between the Mongol and Manchu monarchs and the Tibetan Lamas as patrons and priests. It was never a suzerain-vassal relationship between China and Tibet. Such relationship was initiated and flourished during non-Han dynasties of Yuans and Manchus.12

Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, referring to the suzerainty of China over Tibet observed: "Chinese suzerainty oyer Tibet is a constitutional fiction, a political affectation, which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties .... As a matter of facts the two Chinese (i.e. Manchus) Ambans at Lhasa are there not as Viceroys, but as Ambassadors."13

The status of the Amban can be gauged from the fact that Younghusband refused the former’s offer of mediation between him and the Tibetans and instead decided to deal directly with the Tibetan government. The explanation Amban Yu Tai gave to Mortimer Durnad, the then Foreign Secretary to the Government of British India, amply illustrates the status of Amban: "He was only a guest in Lhasa – not a master – and he could not put aside the real masters, and as such he had no force to speak of.?"14

Tibetan plateau is the most militarized zone in the world today. As against India’s permanent deployment of 7-8 military divisions in the Himalayas, China has 5,00,000 soldiers stationed on the plateau.15 China has also 300 to 400 ready to fire nuclear warheads, and about 1,000 others that may be assembled at short notice, based on the Tibetan plateau. Chinese missiles bases are located at Serkhog (Datong) armed with DF-3 missiles, Terlenkha (Delingha) with DF-4 missiles and at other places to strike targets in Russia ‘and India."16

The Southwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, the Southwest Military Region Command, and the Command Headquarters of the 2nd Field Army of China jointly issued a ‘Political Mobilisation Directive’ on November 8, 1950 on China’s armed invasion of Tibet. It read: "The task of marching into Tibet was to liberate Tibetan people, to complete the important mission of unifying the motherland, to prevent imperialism from encroaching on even one inch of our sovereign territory, and to protect and build the frontier of the motherland."17

It is a well-known fact that India did not handle the Tibetan affair properly. This cost our country immensely. India was spending about Rs 5-6 crore per day about 12-13 years ago for its protection. The Chinese are spending many times more.18 The expenditure on both sides is far greater now.

"I found, to my joy, that my desire that China and India should draw closer to each other was fully reciprocated by China’s leaders, and more especially by that great man who has become the symbol of China’s unity and her determination to be free. I met Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang many times and we discussed the present and the future of our respective countries. I returned to India an even greater admirer of China than I had been previously, and I could not imagine that any adverse fate could break the spirit of these ancient people, who have grown so young again."19

"In my mind the problem of India was tied up with other world problems. More and more I came to think that these separate problems, political or economic, in China, Abyssinia, Spain, Central Europe, India, or elsewhere, were facets of one and the same world problem ... The challenge of fascism and Nazism was in essence the challenge of imperialism."20

The solidarity with China’s cause and struggle was not limited to words; it found active support in India. The Congress organised "thousand of meetings and demonstrations all over the country in sympathy with the people of China" and even other victims.21 Nehru continued to talk of Sino-Indian friendship even after October 1950 Chinese invasion of Tibet, as is evident by his noting dated January 12, 1951:

"Great nations have arisen in Asia with long memories of the past they have lived through and their eyes fixed on a future of promise... China has taken a new shape and a new form but whether we like that shape or form or not, we have to recognize that a great nation has been reborn and is conscious of her new strength. China in her newfound strength, has acted some times in a manner which I deeply regret. But we have to remember the background of China ... We, in India, have had two thousand years of friendship with China. We have differences of opinion and even small conflicts but when we hark back to that long past something of the wisdom of that past also helps us to understand each ether."22

It is amply clear that Nehru had very high opinion about China, but the latter did not reciprocate. Chinese Communist journal World Culture described him as "a rebel against the movement for national independence, a blackguard who undermines the progress of the peoples’ movement, a loyal slave of imperialism into (whose) slavish and bourgeois reactionary character has now been instilled the beastly ambition of aggression."23 The mismatch between Nehru’s idealism and naivety and Mao’s real politic, and their perceptions about each other proved costly for Tibet and India; the Himalayas became a zone of tension and instability. As mentioned above, while Nehru had a very high opinion about China, the Chinese leaders were full of contempt for him and other Indian leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi."24

"Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism are different from the imperialism of the Western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it 10 times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national and historical claims ... While our Western and North-Western threats to security are still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the North and the North-East. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan."25

Charles Bell has quoted the thirteenth Dalai Lama, which provides insightful observation of the China’s behavior towards her adversaries: "The Chinese way is to do something rather mild at first; then to wait a bit and if it passes without objection, to say or do something stronger. But if we take objection to the first statement or action, they urge that it has been a misunderstanding, and cease, for a time at any rate, from troubling us further."26

Mao held Nehru and other Indian leadership in contempt for its emphasis on non-violence as also the Indian culture/religion as he had scant understanding of the same. Zhisui Li, the personal physician of Mao, in his The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The inside story of the’ man who made modern China, has written: "History had taught him to befriend distant states and be wary of those that are near ..."27

Nehru was naive and his naivety was fully used by the Chinese. His lack of understanding of the Chinese psyche and motivations also came to their help. While Mao could himself take strongest actions, he used Zhou to pacify India and the world."28

"Intellectually supple, Pannikar was touched by vanity and ambition and hopelessly lost in the Byzantine maze of Chinese communist politics of which he had no experience. Worse, he was reluctant to take advice from those on his staff equipped to dispense it."29

"There is, however, one aspect of Chinese culture that is little known outside the circle of professional historians. It is the aggressive imperialism that characterized the politics of China throughout the course of her history at least during the part which is well known to us. Thanks to the systematic recording of historical facts by Chinese themselves, an almost unique achievement in oriental countries ... We are in a position to follow the imperial and aggressive policy of China from the third century B.C. to the present day, a period of more than twenty-two hundred years ... It is the characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she should regard it as a part of her empire for ever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years when ever there was a chance of enforcing it."30

Incidentally, it needs mention that "India’s official adoption of the Chinese languages of sovereignty came only in 2003, as a part of the price for a visit to the Beijing by Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee" and it was, according to M.L. Sondhi, a "criminal negligence."31