Dialogue October-December, 2006 , Volume 8 No. 2
Ethnicity and Insurgency in India’s North-East
When
the freedom dawned, the North-East region of the country had the State of Assam
and two Princely States of Manipur and Tripura. It was widely known as Assam.
The phrase ‘North-East’ got wide currency only after the re-organization of
the region and liberation of Bangladesh. Today, we have seven states in the
North-East, if we exclude Sikkim, which joined the North-East Council recently,
and is separated from the rest of the region by the North Bengal districts.
The Sixth Schedule of the
Constitution made provisions for the tribal autonomy in the Hill districts of
Assam in the form of Autonomous District Councils (ADCs). Initially, there were
only four autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in the entire region. Today,
Mizoram, which was only a district of Assam and had an Autonomous District
Council, completed the journey from a district through the Union Territory
status to the Statehood, has four ADCs within it for Chakmas, Lakhers, Pawis and
the Hmars. The Brus (Reangs) are even now continuing their autonomy demand in
Mizoram.
Prior to 1947, there was hardly
any forum in the North-East demanding secession or autonomy, except Naga
National Council (NNC). Mizo Union was for keeping Mizo Hills as a district of
Assam in India. Even Naga National Council resolved in 1946 to keep Naga Hills
as a district in Assam within India. Initially, Phizo was forced to leave
Naga National Council and moderate voice continued to be heard from NNC
platform. Later on he became the leader of the outfit and NNC became the
platform for demanding autonomy for the Nagas.
Initially, the NNC (and its
creation Nagaland Federal Government, NFG) in Nagaland and the Communist outfit
of Hijam Irabot Singh in Manipur were the only insurgent outfits in the
North-East; today there number - including the dormant and withered away ones -
may exceed a hundred. The list of the terrorist outfits given in ‘Annexure
I’ is in no way exhaustive.
Historical Background
The Britishers sowed the seeds
of separateness and secessionism in
the region. Their policy of gradual segregation of the tribals and non-tribals,
hills and the plains; segregation of the tribal population by introduction of
the “Inner Line Regulation”, creation of “non-regulated”, “backward”
and “excluded” areas/tracts was able to break centuries of historical,
cultural, social and religious continuum and connectedness, The colonial
theories/myths – the myth of race, core-fringe conflict, isolation –
colonial mis-interpretation of history and culture further deepened the
impact. The lies of exploitation and hegemony increased the suspicion of
the segregated population. Like rest of India, colonial education and left
ideology – as in Manipur - weakened nationalist feeling. Non-participation
in freedom movement in many areas due to segregation was an added factor.
Over and above, there was a colonial design, such as the Coupland Plan to
separate the hills of India and Myanmar, and to make it a Crown colony.
Historically, the insurgency in
Nagaland developed in above-mentioned colonial background. The British came in
contact of the Nagas after their occupation of upper Assam, and Cachar. The Naga
inhabited areas were gradually and reluctantly incorporated in Assam, The Naga
turbulence was gradually controlled and Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills
districts was able to win over the Nagas. The Naga Club was established in
Kohima with some employees of the Deputy Commissioner’s office, a few village
chiefs and some others in 1918. Its members submitted a memorandum to the Simon
Commission. Out of 20 signatories of the same, 15 were from the Angami tribe,
two Kacha Nagas and one each from the Sema, Lotha, Rengma and Kuki tribes.
Workwise, one was head interpretor, 8 interpretors, one peshkar, three
masters/teachers, one doctor, one potdar, one treasurer, one sub-overseer, two
clerks and one Chaprasi. The Lotha and Ao Tribal Councils were established in
1923 and 1928 respectively. The Naga Hills District Tribal Council (NHDTC) was
formed in April 1945 under the guidance of the Deputy Commissioner, C.R. Pawsey,
who was knighted and awarded M.C. later on. This very organization was renamed
Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) which spearheaded Naga insurgency under the
leadership of Angami Zapu Phizo in mid-1950s.
The
NNC made a demand of the right of self-determination for the Nagas based on the
following:
(i) Ethnic
distinctiveness,
(ii) Distinct social
life, way of living, laws and customs, etc.,
(iii) Different
religion: Christianity and Animism.
While
Phizo demanded separation of Nagaland from India, started rebellion; the
moderate Nagas demanded the formation of Union Territory merging Naga Hills
district of Assam and Tuensang Division of the then NEFA; and then a
full-fledged state within Indian Union. The Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA, a
Union Territory) was given to the Nagas in 1957 as desired by the ‘First Naga
People’s Convention’. There were two more Naga People’s Conventions, which
wanted full-fledged Statehood. Nagaland, the 16th
State of the Indian Union was inaugurated by the then President of India, Dr.
Radhakrishnan on 1st December 1963.
Parallel to the above, the activities of Phizo continued. He was instrumental in
the creation of underground ‘Federal Government of Nagaland’ and ‘Naga
Army’. Nagaland developed as the epicentre of insurgency in the North-East.
Ethnicity linked problem spread throughout Northeast region.
Origin of Insurgency in the North-East
As stated above, the insurgency
originated in the Naga Hills district of Assam. NNC was the outfit and Phizo,
the leader of the insurgent activities. The inept handling of the Naga
insurgency resulted into the proliferation of insurgent activities in
the entire region and the number of insurgent outfits continued to increase.
Growth of Insurgency in the North-East
The formation of Nagaland sent
unhealthy signals throughout the North-East region. leading to destabilization
of Assam state and the Assamese society. It adversely affected Manipur’s
situation also. The reasons are:
l The expenditure for the development and maintenance of
the state machinery was given from the
Consolidated Fund of India. The new
State was not given the burden to mobilize resources.
resource-poor areas in its neighbourhood in Assam and
Manipur.
l
Big states were replicated in Nagaland creating unprecedented avenues
for appointments and
promotions for the educated lot.
l The Naga Hills district of Assam had five Assembly
constituencies; the new State had 52, and
then 60 MLSs, instead of five,
majority of them managing to become ministers.
l The above-mentioned scenario was tempting for others.
Following two unhealthy signals
emerged in the North-East:
-that the social distancing pays,
-that the violence pays.
These signals were never effectively countered. They also wanted all that
the Nagas got by following
their path. Laldenga and Mizo National Front followed
Phizo and NNC; followed the path of
secessionist insurgency; Mizoram State
was created. Laldenga and MNF were the role models for
Bijoy Kumar Hrankhawl and
Tripura Upajati Juva Samiti. There was upsurge of ethnic identity
claims
resulting into social distancing leading to the demands for secession or
autonomy.
l The Manipuris were psychologically hurt. They were
ancient kingdom were to be satisfied with UT
status; Nagas had State. The demand
of greater Nagalim has further aggrevated the problem in
Manipur.
The net result is that the
insurgency continued to grow; number of insurgent outfits has almost touched
three digit mark; the society and the state is destabilized.
The insurgency in Nagaland
persists; Nagas link flow of funds from Delhi and insurgency.; they want to be
superior to other states status-wise. Udayon Misra has observed: “Every
government in Nagaland since the State was formed, has had some stake in
having the insurgency continue. Among other things, the insurgency has
always been a convenient lever to secure greater benefits from the Centre.” (Udayon
Misra, The Periphert Strikes Back , Shimla, Indian Institute of Advanced
Study, 2000, p. 55.).
The Nagas have psychological
problem also; they want to be superior to others status-wise. Otherwise,
greater autonomy is not going to benefit common Nagas. Many view it as a step
forward towards the ultimate aim of secession.
Kinds of Insurgent Outfits
There are three kinds of
insurgent outfits in the North-East region depending on their demands. They are (i)
secessionist outfits, (ii) outfits demanding separate state within India, and
(iii) those demanding Autonomous District Councils (ADCs). All most all the
insurgent outfits in the North-East region, starting with NNC, based their
secessionist demands on separate ethnic identity assertion.
Insurgent outfits, such as: ULFA,
NSCN, UNLF, Revolutionary People’s Front (political wing of People’s
Liberation Army) and many others aim at secession from India. Hhynniewtrep
National Liberation Council, HNLC wants to transform Meghalaya into a state
exclusively for the Khasis. Achik National Volunteer Council, ANVC and
Garo National Council, GNC want a
state exclusively for the Garos. Many organizations, such as Bru National
Liberation Front, BNLF demand autonomy within Mizoram under the provisions of
the 6th
Schedule of the Constitution. Most of the secessionist outfits have armed wings.
ATTF: demands separate tribal
homeland. The demands of the outfits like ALMA, Hyniewtrep Volunteer Council (HVC),
Hmar People’s Convention (HPC) come within the Constitution of India. Kuki
National Assembly (1947; Kuki Inpi) was revived in 1992 to provide relief during
Kuki Naga conflict. The Kuki National Organization (1992), and its armed wing,
KNA, aim at having a Kuki state within Myanmar. The aim of Kuki National Front,
KNF is to get Kukiland within India. Its armed cadres were trained by
Kachin Independence Army of Myanmar (KIA) and it has link with ULFA.
Separatist/Secessionist Ideology:
The separatist/secessionist
ideologies in the North-East are of the following type:
i. Ethnic
ii. Ideological/leftist/Communist, and
iii. Religious.
Many insurgent outfits combine
the above-mentioned ethnic traits. The NNC combined ethnic (Naga ethnicity) and
religious (Christian); the NSCN combined Naga ethnicity, Christianity and
Socialism/Scientific Socialism/Communism. ULFA combines ethnic and
Communist/Scientific Socialism factors and has religious linkages through ISI
and Bangladesh intelligence. Most of the Manipuri outfits claim
separation/secession on ethnic (Pan-Mongolian/ Mongolian/Meithei) and Communist
ideological ground. The First two secessionist groups in the region, NNC under
Phizo; and Revolutionary Nationalist Party (and its armed wing, Manipur Red
Guards) under Hijam Irabot Singh emphasised on Ethnicity. The latter was also a
Communist outfit.
People’s Revolutionary Party of
Kangleipak (PREPAK) United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Kangleipak
Communist Party, (KCP), People’s Liberation Army (of Manipur; PLA), All
Tripura People’s Liberation Organization (ATPLO), Tripura National Volunteers
(TNV) combined ethnic identity with Scientific Socialism/Socialism/Communism.
Ethnic extremism in the North-East was started by Phizo. Manipur has old history
of left extremism; Irabot Singh was a communist. But the secessionist left
extremism got boosted up due to the activities of PLA under Biseshwar Singh. He
combined left-extremism with anti-Mayang (anti-outsider) and pan-Mongoloid
sentiments. NSCN and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) under the
leadership of Bishwamohan Debbarma promoted Christian terrorism. NSCN and NLFT
worked for forcible conversion to Christianity. These outfits were responsible
for the religious oppression of the Hindus and Buddhists in Arunachal Pradesh
and Tripura respectively. Jamatiya Hoda and its leaders, to a large extent, were
able to control NLFT run religious terrorism. NSCN’s religious terrorism
continued unabated.
An Insight into Naga Ethnicity/Naga Identity
An understanding of the Naga
ethnicity and identity formation is necessary so that to understand the
insurgency related proliferation problem in the region.
As mentioned above, Phizo based
his autonomy demand on distinct Naga social life, ethnicity, way of living, laws
and customs. In reality, it is difficult to distinguish the Nagas from the other
communities of the region in one hand and their homogeneity on the other. Hutton
wrote:
“If not impossible, it is
exceedingly difficult to propound any test by which a Naga tribe can be
distinguished from other Assam or Burma tribes, which are not Nagas.1
The intra-Naga heterogeneity, on
the other hand, is unimaginable. Hutton further writes: about the feature of the
Angami Nagas:
“It would be impossible to give
any general description of the type of the Angami features, as it varies from
village to village and even from house to house to remarkable degree. The
flattened nose and slightly oblique eye of a decidedly Mongolian type may be
seen side by side with a straightness of eyes and nose that might be purely
Aryan.2
W.C. Smith has listed 14
traits of the Tibeto-Burmans – head-hunting, dormitory for the young men,
house on piles, disposal of the dead on platforms, tribal marriage customs,
betel chewing, aversion to milk, lack of political organization, double sylinder
forge, loin-loom, hexagonal shields, residence in hilly regions and jhum
cultivation. These are not the common markers for the Nagas. Anthony
Smith, in his definition of the ethnic community, enumerate the marker of ethnic
community as “a named human population with a myth of common ancestory, shared
memories and cultural elements, link to a historic territory or homeland; and a
measure of solidarity.”3. The language, race, religion and
colour are the markers, according to Ghai.4.
It needs mention that the Nagas do not have common myth of origin and
migration. They lack common language, identical social and cultural elements and
all the markers enumerated above. To talk of the common memory of the Naga
tribes is absurd, as they did not know even the names of the tribes
except for the few and had the memory of only the mutual feud and enmity only 17
years before voicing of their autonomy demands in 1929. The deplorable state of
the knowledge of the signatories of the Simon Commission memorandum about the
Nagas comes to light from the following quote from the memorandum:
“Our country within the
administered area consists of more than eight tribes, quite different from one
another with different languages which can not be understood by each other, and
there are more Tribes outside the administrated area which are not known at
present. We have no unity among us and it is really the British Government that
is holding us together now.”
It is clear from the above that
Nagas lack ethnic and socio-cultural identity, as is the case with some other
tribes/groups also, and as such any anthropological basis of Naga identity is
a fluid one as different communities constantly come in and out of it. At one
time, even, Kacharis, Kukis, Abors5,
Karbis, Nepalis,6
Khamtis and Singphos7
were included in the list of the Nagas, whereas Manipuri Nagas, including
Muivah’s own tribe, Tangkhul was excluded from the same.8 Today Muivah is continuing his
ethnic cleansing drive against the Kukis forgetting the fact that one of the
Kukis signed Simon Commission Memorandum as a Naga.
Phizo propagated that Nagaland
had never been a part of India, that only the British conquered it. Therefore
with the lapse of the suzerainty, the Nagas ipso-facto became independent. The
truth is that various tribes of the Nagas remained under the Ahom9,
Meithei10 and the Kachari kings. The Eastern Nagas remained under Singhpho
Chiefs. These facts cannot be ignored
and therefore it is difficult to understand the “unique history” of
the Nagas claimed by Muivah.
Anals, Lamkhangs and Monsangs
belong to Kuki-Chin group and use Kuki-Chin languages as mother-tongues. Now
they claim Naga identity.11 Muivah is
indulging in forced identity formation not only by ethnic and communist
terrorism, but also by religious terrorism by forced conversion to Christianity.
NSCN-IM has the slogan of ‘Nagaland for Christ’. The eastern Nagas of Mynmar
have closer affiliations with the Kachins; NSCN-IM had to forcibly establish
themselves among them in some of the areas as in Kesan Chanlam, and convert them
to Christianity. The book of Bertil Lintner, Land of Zade, which
points out these facts, is reportedly banned by Muivah
12 The tribes of Tirap and Arunachal
Pradesh are being forcibly converted in similar way to Christianity.13
There always existed
historical, cultural, social and religious ‘connectedness’
between the hills and the plains of the North-East region of the country. The
British worked to break the same by isolating the hills and plains of the
region by segregation of different communities and the sub-regions. They
introduced ‘Inner Line regulation’, created ‘non-regulated; ‘backward’
and ‘excluded areas/tracts: prevented freedom movement to penetrate and get
strengthened. The British wanted to separate the hills of North-East India and
Myanmar and create a separate ‘Crown Colony’. Their plan, known as Coupland
plan, could not succeed, as the freedom came too early. However, the over
all impact of the colonial British functionaries on selected tribal
intelligentsia was responsible for sowing the seeds of separatism in the
North-East.
The British gave twist to the
interpretation of the history and culture of the region. The myth of race,
hypothesis of core-fringe conflict; myths of isolation, hegemony of and
exploitation had no basis. But their over all impact created suspicion in
the mind of one section of our people for the others. A grudge that tribes were
neglected, that they were exploited by their neighbours in the plains were
completely baseless colonial fabrications which created divisive mind-set. The
impact of these colonial theories and myths and the colonial education,
weakening of the traditions and the traditional values were responsible for
creating mercenaries out of the half-educated ones not only in NE region but in
the entire country.
Factors responsible for strengthening Insurgency:
Some of the factors responsible
for unrestricted growth and strengthening of insurgency/insurgent outfits are
given below:
Insurgency-Politician Nexus
It is well-known fact that many
insurgent secessionist outfits in the North-East, especially in Assam, Manipur,
Mizoram, Tripura and Nagaland could grow and get strong due to
insurgent-politician nexus. ULFA “was able to become a large outfit
primarily due to the tacit support provided by the first AGP regime under
Prafulla Kumar Mahanta”. The outfit was running a parallel government in Assam
during that period.14 This was
described as “One of the classic example of culpable inaction on the part of
the State government” by Assam’s former Governor D.D. Thakur.15
Mr. B.P. Chaliha, the then Chief Minister of Assam and a shrewd
politician, ignoring the serious implications for national unity and security, released
Laldenga from jail in 1963, taking him to be potential ally for neutralizing
the growing influence of the Mizo Union in the Mizo Hills district. Laldenga
continued his anti-national activities and the nation paid the price for the
short-sighted party politics of Mr. Chaliha16.
Lt Gen V.K. Nayar (Retd.), the
Governor of Manipur & acting Governor of Nagaland accused S.C. Jamir of
patronizing NSCN-K.17 Gen. Nayyar in
his special report to the President of India wrote about S.C. Jamir:
“With Shri Jamir supporting
NSCN (K), tribal alignments with Aos, Konyaks, Phoms firmly with him NSCN (K),
and Semas, Angamis and other Southern Tribes against him and NSCN(I) have
already fermented”18
NSCN (IM) has increased its influence internally. This process
was helped considerably by the defeat of the Congress(I) led Jamir government in
the last elections It is alleged that with the connivance of the then NDA
governmentt.at the Centre, which gave the NSCN-IM cadres free hand to
intimidate and influence the results. It allowed the NSCN-IM to drive out the
moderate leadership from the Naga HOHO and other civil society establishments.
This short-sighted strategy has given the secessionist NSCN-IM a clout beyond
its support base, mainly based on fear.
Gen. Nayar wrote about Rishang
Keishing in his report:
“NSCN (I) and its sympathizers
and collaborators over the past few months have surreptitiously revived and
propagated successfully the old theme of South Nagaland by exploiting the
sentiment of Naga identity and interest. In this, Shri Rishang Keishing,
Dy. Chief Minister, Marung Makunga, Minister of State and A.S. Arthur, ex-MLA
(all of Congress-I) have played a dubious role with the help of
over-ground front organizations of United Naga Council, Tangkhul Long and tribal
youth and student organizations (.) A combination of Naga sentiment, threat and
Kuki baiting have been effectively employed to dominate Naga inhabited areas of
four of the five hill districts of Ukhrul, Chandel, Senapati and Tamenglong (.)
In real terms it is domination of NSCN (I) and Tangkhuls” (.)19
In Manipur, “almost every
party are busy cultivating underground groups to be one-up on their
political adversaries as also to strengthen their bargaining position vis-ŕ-vis
the Central government, while paying lip-service to their nationalistic
credentials. Constitutional perversity and political bickerings have crossed new
limits. Political opportunism has led to erosion and breakdown of democratic
institutions.20 It is alleged
that some political leaders of Manipur maintained close links with secessionist
terrorist outfits like PLA and NSCN.21 Evidences
are not lacking about the complex web of collusion between substantially
criminalized terrorist outfits and various political parties of Manipur. At
least five ministers of Nipamacha Singh government, as per a Union Ministry of
Home Affairs Report, had direct links with terrorists of the NSCN-K, PLA, UNLF,
KYKL (Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup and ZRA (Zomi Revolutionary Army).22
Parliament was informed about the receipts of Rs. three lakhs by UNLF from
former Manipur Chief Minister Nipamacha Singh and former Speaker Chandramani
Singh of Manipur Legislative Assembly.23
Two Kuki National Front terrorists were arrested at the official residence of
the then Transport Minister of Manipur, Haokholet Kipgen by the security force
personnel on November 28, 2000. This led Central Government to announce an
investigation into clandestine alliance between the politicians and terrorist
outfits.24
In Tripura, the seed of
insurgency was sown by the Communist Party of India
(CPI) under the leadership of Dashrath Deb during 1948-51 as a part of the
larger movement to ‘liberate India from its then ruling classes.’ The
political parties – Congress and CPI/CPM – have developed stable nexus
over the years after independence. The insurgent outfits target the
civilian population during elections as a part of their strategy to help their
patron political parties. Out of the two most criminalized terrorist
outfits, “the NLFT is said to have close link with the Congress (I)
while the ATTF is aligned with the ruling left front.”25
Here it needs mention that it goes to the credit of the electorate of Tripura as
elsewhere in the country, that they go and cast their votes inspite of the
threat of the terrorist outfits, who act as vote-mercenaries. It is
alleged that the terrorists inspired mass killings during elections helped the
formation ministries in Tripura.
Pre-poll violence was witnessed
during December 1982, before January 1983 Assembly elections. Violence unleashed
on non-tribals before 1988 elections by the TNV, under the leadership of Bijoy
Kumar Hrankhawl, took the toll of more than hundred lives, and turned the
poll-eve atmosphere in favour of Congress, as alleged. The Congress-TUJS
coalition government was formed and Hrangkhawl came overground. The CPI-M, then
supported the formation of All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF) so that to keep away
the Congress from the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous Tribal Council, (TTAADC).
ATTF continued to kill selectively the leaders of Congress and TUJS during
the rule of Congress-TUJS coalition and brief President’s rule period. The
killings before April 1993 elections resulted into the Left Front’s victory in
the elections. A section of the ATTF, under the leadership of Lalit Debbarma,
surrendered. Another factions continued insurgent activities under the
leadership of Ranajit Debbarma so that to reap the benefits of
insurgency-politics nexus.26
It is alleged that NLFT sponsored a political front, the Indigenous People’
front of Tripura (IPFT) before April 30 and May 3, 2000 elections of TTAADC. The
NLFT selectively killed 78 activists and leaders of the CPI-M after the
notifications of the elections and 111 after the election. The NLFT backed IPFT
came to power by winning 18 seats out of 30 for which the elections were held.27
The degenerate politics of the
Congress and the CPI-M in Tripura is solely responsible for the continuance of
the insurgency in that tiny state. The
NLFT and ATTF are highly criminalized gangs. Though there are over thirty
terrorist outfits in Tripura, the most powerful among them are NLFT and ATTF
only. The others are either just rag-tag criminal gangs or are dormant.28
The terrorist outfits of Tripura have transformed abduction into a lucrative
industry. Tripura accounts for 70 per cent of the abductions of the
North-Eastern region.
Arunachal Pradesh
suffers mostly due to spill over of the terrorist activities of the NSCN-IM and
NSCN-K. The state is not free from terrorism-politics nexus. I Wanglat, MLA
demanded CBI or judicial enquiry in June 2000 to ascertain abetting and
sponsoring of insurgency in Tirap and Changlang districts. He further demanded
that the political leaders found guilty should be arrested and asked to
relinquish office.29
Former Chief Minister Gegong Apang alleged on April 6, 2001 that some ministers
and MLAs were harbouring and abetting insurgents in the State, and had direct
links with NSCN-K, and NSCN-IM in Tirap and Changlang.30 NSCN-K, with sizeable presence
in Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh had established a
reciprocal relationship with Chief Minister Mukut Mithi’s Arunachal Congress.31
As stated earlier, ULFA received unchallenged political patronage in Assam,
which made the outfit most powerful. The attitude of the first AGP government
towards the outfit may be judged from the fact that Bhrigu Kumar Phukan, the
then Home Minister described ULFA as being ‘from among us’32
Insurgency-Bureaucracy Links
The reports of the collusion of
government servants, including the senior IAS officers with the insurgent
outfits comes to light from time to time. It was alleged that S.K. Tiwari,
Commissioner, General Administration Department, Assam and P. Verma, Secretary,
Transport maintained direct links with ULFA. It was reported that Verma even met
the ULFA General Secretary, Golap Barua and foreign secretary, Raju Barua,
before their arrest in Calcutta. The former was carrying an identity card issued
to him by Verma.33 H.N. Das, Chief
Secretary, Assam wrote to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to take action
against Chandra Das, Commissioner, Panchayat & Rural Development, and Food
& Civil Supply, Education Commissioner, Prafulla Kumar Sarma and Revenue
Commissioner, P.C. Misra for their alleged involvement and direct connection
with the ULFA.34 There may be many reasons for
such deviant behaviour of the administrative officers. It may be due to fear or
due to acting on taking a cue from their over-conciliating political bosses. But
a large number of them remained firm and did not yield to the threat/terror and
many such officers were killed.
Collusion with bureaucracy 13/128
In Manipur, many officers
resisting terrorist demands were shot. The Director Tourism, an IAS officers did
not agree to pay ransom, and was shot. The Registrar of Cooperative was abducted
and severely injured for not paying ransom. The Director of Education also
suffered. The Divisional Engineer, telephones did not waive the bills of two
PCOs operated by NSCN-IM and PLA, and was killed. The Chief Engineer, Loktak
Project was killed by KYKL insurgents on January 12, 2000. As reported, his
security was withdrawn on an unwritten order to the Director general of Police.35
In Manipur, the militant outfits
were successful in subverting the Public distribution system through their
linkages with the politicians. The tankers of kerosene oil, petrol, and diesel
were diverted from the dealers and sold in the black market by all militant
groups. In many cases contracts were procured by unqualified members of militant
groups at gunpoint. Only 50 percent of the work is executed, but Executive
Engineers and their seniors are forced to enter full execution of the work in
the measurement book and to make full payment for the half executed work. Half
of sum goes to the caufers of the militant group. Such extortions continue in
all other departments and in other states also.36
Diverted rice from the public distribution system were partly supplied to the
underground camps; partly supplied to the black-markets. The PLA and UNLF sold
rice and kerosene oil at very low rates in the villages around their camps in
Churachandpur and Chandel districts and thus aquired a ‘Robin Hood’ image.
The people in Imphal were getting a liter or two per month per family against
the quota of five, whereas the villagers were hardly getting any.37
Initially, the politicians
started siphoning or large-scale diversion of development funds in collusion
with spineless bureaucrats. After that the insurgent outfits intervened and
started taking a major share of the deals. The non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) of Manipur, mostly run by the politicians on the names of
their hanger-on, use only a trickle of the funds, approximately five per cent,
for the real work, such as the housing for the rural poor, watershed
projects. Rest of the money received by the NGOs from the Central government as
grants is siphoned out.38 In such a case,
these schemes also came under the extensive network of extortion enriching the
terrorist coffers. The situation worsened most during the People’s Front
government in Manipur of 2000, when the ‘nexus between the PLA and the UNLF
with the politicians reached its peak.’39
Many Central leaders have warned
the State governments of the NE region in the past against payments of the
development funds to the insurgents. Venkiah Naidu, Union Rural Development
Minister, during the meeting of the Rural Development Ministers of the region at
Shillong on June 14, 2001, warned that “the centre would stop disbursing rural
development funds to those States, where a bulk of the funds go to the coffers
of the extremist outfits.”40
Such warnings have been given to the NGOs also.
* Partisan dealing of the central
Agencies with the insurgent outfits was reported by the Governor, Gen. V.K.
Nayar; it to a large extent contributed in escalation of divisive politicians of
Manipur (Nayar, V.K., p. 101.
Insurgent-Police Collusion
Some cases of the collusion
between the insurgent groups and the police have also been reported from time to
time. The Nagaland Armed Police lost 96 weapons and large quantities of
amminition during July 1995 during two raids by NSCN-IM at Peren and Ranga Pahar.
It was possible due to collusion between the local police and the insurgents,
according to the Army sources. Lt. Gen. O.P. Kaushik of the Eastern Commend of
the Army, in a Press Conference in Calcutta in July 1995, accused the local
police, state government officials and politicians for their collusion with the
underground groups.41
There were cases of desertion
from the service, collusion and illegal arms sale to the ULFA by policemen. Two
policemen disappeared with their arms and the ULFA insurgents, they were
guarding, and joined ULFA camps. Chief Minster Saikia issued a statement after
this incident that 500 police constables recruited in Assam during AGP regime
between 1985 and 1987 had ULFA links and four of them were actually being
trained in ULFA camps in the Kachin state in Myanmar.42
It was reported that higher police department officials were in possession of a
good number of documents, reports and videocassettes revealing the intensity of
the nexus. As reported, policemen participated in valleyball matches with ULFA
cadres, attended shraddha ceremony of slain ULFA insurgents; and imparted
martial art training to their cadres in Upper Assam. (Patriot, New Delhi, August
24, 2001). There was media report of the sale of arms to the ULFA from an armory
in Sibsagar district by two constables in September 1992.43 The nexus
included some higher police officers also. It was reported that ULFA received
prior information about army raid during operation Bajrang from a top IB
officer, having cordial relation with the outfit.44
The Media Support
Media
coverage in India does not provide in-depth object information about insurgent
outfits and their activities. In many cases, we find coverage sympathetic to the
insurgents. A large section of our intellectuals and mediamen share the ideology
with the ideological terrorists. Many share the confusions of the ethnic
insurgents. Unfortunately, our mediamen have scant understanding of the
North-East. Many of them create havoc when they attempt at doctrinairing on
behalf of the terrorists. Parag Kumar Das was one such journalist. He was the
editor of the Assamese journal journal Budhwar. He was regarded as the
one of the finest theoreticians of ULFA. Weekly Budhwar acted as a front
for the ULFA. ULFA’s Publicity Secretary answered queries and explained the
policies of the outfit in almost every issue of the weekly. Das wrote a booklet Swadhinatar
Prastab, in which he emphasised that the Assamese have always been
ethnically different from the rest of India. According to him, the Assamese are
closer to their ‘Mongolian brothers’ than to the Indo-Aryan ones. Assamese
‘socio-cultural ethos’ are different from those of the Indians. Das brings
the case of well-known Vaishnavite saint, Sankaradeva and writes that being a
fish-eater, Sankaradeva was not a part of the ‘Indian socio-cultural ethos’.
Das did not know that all category of Indians, including the Brahmins from
Bengal and Mithila to Konkan coast, eat fish. Parag Kumar Das, and the
supporters of secessionist insurgency like him base their anti-national
arguments on unverified simplistic and selective facts ignoring the commonality
of pan-Indian socio-cultural traits and over emphasizing the differences. Two
journalists of Assam, Rajib Bora of Sentinel and Manjit Mahanta of Ajir Asom
were accused by the Government and arrested on November 25 and 26, 1991 for
running errand for the ULFA serving as low-level couriers, using their office
telephones to send and receive message, type, photocopy and distribute ULFA’s
statements among other journalists, etc.45
Many news-papers of Assam, published from Guwahati and other districts, used to
publish ULFA Press Release without changing even a word. When there was mass
surrender of the ULFA cadres in 1992, then the editor of Ami, an Assamese
journal wrote: “ULFA did not drop from the sky, nor is ULFA a wild animal.
ULFA is our child. (The members of) ULFA are our brothers, they are our kin. (We
must understand) why they have chosen the path of the jungle.”46
These amply illustrate the emotional attachment of a section of the Press
towards ULFA and the latter’s sway over the media. The insurgents in other
states also use the media for their benefit in more or less the same way.
It
will be oversimplification to say that the press in general supports
terrorist/insurgent outfits in the North-East. There are many in the media
who do not toe to the line of thinking of the latter; are pressurized by them
and work under severe strain. Many in the media have deep understanding of
the region and its problems; its links with the country in
socio-cultural-historical continuum frame. India is neither an ‘imaginary
state’ for them, nor the ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ is anathema. They
are not enchanted and romanticized by the ‘revolutionary’ image of the ULFA,
NSCN, RNP, PREPAK, TNV, KCP and the like. But the task of the media is
difficult. Media men are threatened and even killed. The ‘messengers are in
peril’ as Patricia Mukhim asserts. She rightly says: “North-East India
is afflicted by two very pernicious forces both of which want to either gobble
up media space or to gag the media. The former demand that their statements be
reported verbatim. The latter want media to look the other way while they commit
a crime. Both are difficult propositions for any media person worth his salt.”47
Recently four journalists of Assam received warnings from ULFA for their for
their truthful reporting and analysis. We are happy and proud to have such
journalists who continue to face such challenges.
As
always happens whenever the country tries to reach at some sort of understanding
with, be it Pakistan, USA, NSCN-IM or ULFA, planted stories appear in the media,
advising New Delhi to be either more flexible, show more commitment, or to
reject any proposal outright. The media, thus creates haziness and confusion,
fails to play positive role.
Support from Human Rights Organizations and NGOs to the Insurgents
The insurgents of North-East, and
elsewhere also, receive overt or covert support from a large number of ‘Human
Rights Organizations’ and the organizations of the Civil society. The open
support and sympathy of Human rights activists, Naga Students Federation and
many NGOs for the Naga insurgents is well-known fact. As reported, the Centre
was “contemplating suspension of all funds to Manipur based NGOs, as several
of them act in collusion with the terrorists.”48
Support from Foreign Human Rights Groups/NGOs
NSCN and other
terrorist/insurgent outfits continue to get external support.49 NSCN-IM
has simultaneously expanded its activities outside India. While India failed to
send representatives and NGOs to Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
at Hague, and at the same time contest the entry of NSCN-IM as a member of the
same, the outfit got an opportunity to propagate its cause in international
forums and was able to open avenues for arms and ammunition in SE Asia, Europe
and America. Flemish support group for indigenous people (KWIA) also made a
‘Declaration on Nagaland’, committed itself to “the inherent right of the
Naga people to self-determination and independence.”
Many fronts of the insurgent outfits, such as U.K. based Assam
Watch, an alleged front of ULFA, work in U.K. and other countries. It needs
mention that the Assam Watch sponsored ULFA’s chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa and
its general secretary Anup Chetia to attend a meeting of the UN
Sub-Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous people held in July 1997 at
Geneva; they fled only after the Interpol issued Red Corner Alert notice against
them. Organizations and the individuals attend the meetings of the United
Nations Working Group of Indigenous People (UNWGIP) and discuss internal matter
of India.
External Help
The reports of the help received
by various insurgent outfits from foreign agencies and Governments pour in from
time to time. These outfits receive fund, arms, arms training, and shelter; and
are provided passport and visas to the leaders of the outfits to enable them to
travel in different countries. These outfits received help from China, Paistan
and Bangladesh, Pakistan’s ISI and Bangladesh Directorate of Forces
Intelligence (DGFI) from time to time. Camps of various insurgent groups are
safely sheltered in Bangladesh. Such camps were located in Myanmar, and for some
years even in Bhutan. There have been allegations of NSCN’s link even with al-Qaeda.
. Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) and Kachin Independent Army (KIA) under
Bransen in Myitkyina in Northern Myanmar used to provide arms and training to
various outfits on payment. Its link with NSCN was established in 1985. The
People’s Liberation Army of Manipur has also link with the KIO. ULFA joined
later on in 1985.Training facilities for ULFA cadres was arranged by ISI in the
camps of Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. ISI and DGFI facilitated the arms
procurement for Indian insurgent outfits from South-East Asian arms market.
Networking between the Insurgent Outfits
The
NSCN-IM increased its strength by the establishment of new insurgent
organizations and networking with the old and the new. It helped in the
formation of NDFB (National democratic Front of Bodoland), BLT (Bodo Liberation
Tigers; formerly, Bodo Liberation Tiger Force), KNV (Karbi National Volunteers)
DHD (Dima Halim Daoga), ANVC (Achik National Voluneer Council), NLFT (National
Liberation Front of Tripura). The NSCN-IM sells arms to these outfits and
provides arms training to their cadre. It receives 60:40 shares from the
collections out of extortions, kidnappings, taxes, bank robberies. United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) also received arms and training from the NSCN.
The former helped in the formation of Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO).
ULFA’s condition to the Rajbongshi leadership and to All Kamtapur Students
Union (SKSU) to provide arms training was that they form a secessionist outfit.
As a result of their agreement, KamtapurLiberation Organization (KLO) was
formed. It provided arms and arms training to the cadres of the outfit, and used
to receive share from the collections out of extortions, kidnappings by the KLO
or during their jount operations. ULFA cultivated its links with like-minded
other outfits also. Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl and his outfits continued to receive
help and training from Mizo National Front.
Other
Factors: There are many other factors,
which strengthen the insurgent/terrorist outfits, especially during the
formative days. Some of them are:
(i) Robinhood image of the terrorist outfits: Many insurgent groups
acquire Robinhood image and
become popular among the masses. ULFA’s steps
against corruption, drug-trafficking, illegal trade
in rhino horns, molestation
of women, prostitution and private tuition, etc gave them popular
legitimacy and
strength. Manipuri outfits distributed rice and K. oil on cheaper rates among
the
villagers around their camps. This, however, does not continue for long as
the masses become tired
due to prolonged violence and extortion or due to some
unpopular act of the outfit. ULFA’s
Robinhood image was broken after Sanjoy
Ghosh’s killing.50
(ii) There is lack
of proper perspective among the politicians; they seldom look at the problem
from long-term perspective. Governments/politicians allow terrorist
organizations to consolidate;
start peace process when the outfits need time to
re-organize; they often Ignoring growth of
anti-national secessionist forces The
weaknesses in handling terrorism give them strength.51
(iii) Non-percolation
of development benefits leads to alienation among the masses. The masses, at
a
time start believing that the insurgents may bring positive change.
(iv) Simplistic approach of tackling insurgency through show of force;
taking it only as law &
order problem; talking in terms of deployment of
army/para-military forces/modernization of arms
only exhibits our lack of
understanding of the problem. Then failure of the approach leads to panic
response.
(v) Weak
intellectual front; inability to fight intellectual war strengthens
insurgent cause as people
start believing the myths and the propaganda of the
insurgents. .vi. Cases of security forces
remaining un-alert even after
timely warning, as happened during attack on Oinam camp in
Manipur, has come
to light. Recently, the seizure of 73 gigabytes of classified defence
information
carefully stored in 40 CDs and two laptops from I. Mani Singh, a
“deputy intelligence officer” of the
PLA an insurgent outfit of Manipur,
points towards our flopped security net and the militants going
high
tech. This is an equally disturbing feature of our lapse.52
Faction Fights
A
permanent trait of the insurgent outfits of the North-East is factionalism. This
trait is even more prominent among Maoist and Islamist insurgents. The main
reason of factionalism in the insurgent outfits is the personality clash and
dictatorial/intolerant attitude of the insurgent leaders. Sakhrie was
mercilessly butchered by Phizo when he differed from him. After NNC accepted
Indian sovereignty and signed Shillong accord, in 1975, a splinter group named
of NNC Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formed in 1980. The
NSCN split in 1988 into two factions; one led by Isaak Swu and T. Muiva, and the
other by S.S. Khaplang. NNC was also divided into two factions after the death
of Phizo. In Manipur, both PLA and PREPAK were formed by one time members of
UNLF. PREPAK has two factions led by Salam Nabachandra alias Khomba and Meriaba
respectively. The two factions of KCP are led by Yendrembam Ibohanbi, the
president of the United outfit, and by Mutum Ibopishak. A group of UNLF is led
by Oken Singh. In Manipur, only PLA did not suffer from factionalism and split.
A very large section of ULFA has surrendered to the Government and is presently
known as SULFA. The Bodo insurgent outfits also could not remain free from this
malady. The split and factionalism was seen in the insurgent outfits of Tripura
also. ATTF and DHD split into Hindu and Christian factions. In many cases there
is split on tribal lines.53
A very
sad aspect of the factionalism among insurgent outfits is the internecine clash
in which thousands of persons have lost their lives. The fratricidal war between
NSCN-IM and NSCN-K continue unabated. A large number of Bodos have lost their
lives in the fratricidal war between the BLT and NDFB54
Prominent Weaknesses of the Indian Insurgent Outfits
Certain
weaknesses are inherent in Indian insurgent/terrorist outfits. Their leadership
is dictatorial; the ethos are non-democratic. The military wing often dominates
over the political wing. As reported about ULFA, “the individual members at
the lower rungs has hardly any right to express his opinion”. The organization
often throttles inner party democracy; violence is used in order to settled
‘personal scores’55 Lion share of coffers is
operated by the leaders of ULFA without the knowledge of its cadres. The topmost
rebel leaders lead lavish life style, which has earned them disrepute and the
title of “silver screen’ rebels’56
It is pertinent to quote Sanjoy Hazarika in this case. He writes:
“The
Assamese widened the description of guerrilla warfare in this region: from
jungle camps and in uncertain income from villages – in the form of taxes
levied by the Nagas and Mizos – the rebel movement soared to the five star
culture”57 Money laundering by ULFA leaders
has been a well-known fact.58
They have invested fhuge money in the industry in Bangladesh.
The
other outfits, especially the NSCN-IM, is second to none in the traits mentioned
above. Muivah and other insurgent leaders do not tolerate dissent, live
lavishly. It is reported that the NSCN leaders have purchased property in
Shillong.59
Lumpenisation
of all the insurgent outfits is a well-known phenomenon due to the willing
acceptance/recruitment of the criminals in their ranks. This is true in case of
bigger outfits like ULFA also.60
The
unprincipled about-turn stand of the ULFA on the issue of ‘Illegal Migration
from Bangladesh’ is not viewed favorably by Assamese civil society. In
reality, an Ulfa leader staying in Bangladesh is viewed as the “Enemy’s
Friend’. Paresh Baruah, C-in-C of ULFA, who has 12 safe addresses in Dhaka, is
known by ‘friendly’ names Kamaruj Zaman Khan and Zaman Bhai. Zaman
Bhai is compelled to give his wife and two children also ‘friendly’
Bangladeshi names. None is convinced in Assam, and the rest of the country, that
ULFA leader’s aim to create sovereign ‘xonar Asom’ by liberating it from
and that of his host,61
Bangladesh to create ‘Greater
Bangladesh’ converge. In reality, the people understand the rhetoric whether
of an insurgent outfit or a political party. AGP wanted to form government with
AUDF, whose whole agenda is to safeguard, nourish and expand the domain of
illegal Bangladeshis and retention of the provisions of IMDT Act. The voting
pattern changed during last Assam Assembly elections after AGP’s rhetoric. AGP
wanted to form government with AUDF, whose whole agenda is to safeguard, nourish
and expand the domain of illegal Bangladeshis and retention of the provisions of
IMDT Act.
The
people know that insurgency in the North-East is anti-people; it
facilitates corruption; helps politicians, bureaucrats, government suppliers,
criminals, extortionists in pocketing government funds; keeps perpetual resource
crunch and does not allow the poorest of the poor from getting the benefits of
development. The insurgents promote cleavage among communities; deepen
Faultlines. People do not oppose the insurgents only due to fear of gun.
Ethnic
clash in many parts of North-East region has assumed worrisome proportion. This
has taken the form of ethnic cleansing in many areas such as in NSCN’s action
against the Kukis in Manipur, anti-Santhal violence in Bodo areas. The clashes
between the Karbis and Kacharis in Karbi-Anglong district, Kacharis and Hmars in
North-Cachar Hills district of Assam, Mizos and Brus (Reangs) in Mizoram and
many more used to cause concern and worry. NSCN-IM’s attempted towards ethnic
cleansing of the Kukis started when the former’s interest of monopolizing the
benefits of illicit trade through Moreh route came in clash with that of the
Kukis.( Marwah 294-95) This led the chain of developments resulting into arming
of Kukis and insurgency among Paites of Churachandpur district of Manipur.
Funding
of Insurgent Outfits: Sources of the
Funding of the insurgent are bank-robberies, extortion, pilferage of government
funds, smuggling, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities..
Demise
of India: ULFA’s Hope: ULFA’s hope
of Swadhin Assam rests on the demise of India. This is in conformity with the
thinking of the Islamist insurgents also.
Conflict Resolution
There
have been many attempts towards conflict resolution in the region in the past.
It included official conflict resolution and the civil society driven attempts
for the same. The talk of the Central Government with the NSCN-IM is going on
for some years. In Assam, the People’s Consultative Group (PCG) initiative has
brought fruit; Central government and ULFA may talk directly and resolve the
problem. However, caution is necessary as the insurgent outfits of the
North-East are not known for honoring the agreements, be it the
understanding with Naga moderate leaders leading to NHTA or Nagaland State
formation or the Shillong Accord with the NNC, ‘Memorandum of Understanding’
(MoU) signed with the outfits in Tripura and in many other places. The
signing of MoU and surrenders lead us nowhere as a splinter group of the
insurgents often revives the issue, gathers strength and the problem continues.
As the tired Governments gradually concede their demands, the insurgents/outfits
slowly move towards their goal.
In
Assam, while at one hand PCG was trying to bring the Centre and ULFA together
for direct talks, the spurt in violence by ULFA continued. Attempts are going on
to get some ULFA leaders released from jail to facilitate talks. Such attempts
failed earlier to bring result, as a released leader went to Dhaka not to return
back. NSCN-IM, in all these years of ceasefire, continued to indulge in
mobilizing arms and resources, recruiting cadres, extortion and violent
activities. Its extortion activities continued even in Assam and bank dacoity in
collusion with another terrorist outfit outside Nagaland. It was reported that
NSCN-IM mobilized foreign trained cadres with sophisticated arms to prevent
eviction of illegally settled persons in Assam. This outfit does not want
any other outfit or civil society body to talk on behalf of the Nagas. It wants
to be their only representative in the talks with GoI. Thus the outfit’s
attitude and its impossible demands, such as that of ‘Greater Nagaland’, are
the greatest hurdles for the peace process. There is no doubt that even if there
is an agreement with the NSCN-IM, the peace will not return as other
non-participating outfits have the capacity to prolong insurgency.
It is felt that of patience,
mutual dialogue and understanding are the key factors to resolve such disputes
and problems. Threats and actual use of force to reinforce one’s claims are
not only destructive but are becoming increasingly counter-productive. Every
protagonist, it is felt, must weigh his or her options and explore possibilities
of dialogue and conciliation. To expect the Central govt. and the state govt’s
alone to resolve it is becoming increasingly impractical. Besides, any effort to
hurry the process by force of arms is no longer acceptable. With patience and
mutual restraint with passage of time solutions can be found.
It needs mention that some recent
positive developments in the region generate hope. Although the chauvinist
voice, prompted by the fear of gun, continues to be heard in Assam, the Assamese
auto-critiquing has blunted its edge. Moreover, the Assamese have very strong
under-current of nationalist feeling. This was amply demonstrated during Kargil
War, when ULFA was thrown to the margin after its appeal to support Pakistan. In
Nagaland, Sema Hoho has raised its voice against NSCN-IM inspired violence and
then asked the outfit to apologise. In a parallel development, Chakhesang
Students Union, Chakhesang Baptist Church Council, Chakhesang Mothers
Association and Chakhesang Youth Front jointly urged the Government of Nagaland
to send ultras back to designated camps. The Naga urge for peace combined with
the courage to counter violence is a happy development.
Ethnicity-related problems need
multi-dimensional/multi-stage tackling, including tackling on intellectual and
human rights fronts. While peace efforts should be allowed and facilitated
with utmost sincerity, the Governments – Central and the State –should
ensure that the terms of cease-fire agreements are strictly adhered to and
none falls prey to insurgents’ bullets.
It is high time that the Central
government (i) formulates proper policy regarding the ethnicity and insurgency
related problems, (ii) learns to say ‘no’ to the impossible demands
of the insurgents, e.g., the demands of inclusion of parts of Assam where not
even two percent Nagas reside; (iii) ensures proper utilization of the funds
flowing to the States; and (iv) initiating positive changes in the system of
education with the help of the State governments, UGC and the Central
Universities of the region.
The state governments should
ensure (i) the stoppage of extortions, and pilferage of the public funds; (ii)
gradual assumption of their duty of mobilization of local resources; sharing the
financial burden more and more; (iii) gradual reduction in their dependence on
army and paramilitary forces for the maintenance of law and order in the state.
It is essential to answer every
myth and lie; counter every wrong signal - emanating even from the
governments’ wrong actions; as discussed earlier - and every propaganda of the
insurgents and the media supporting them. There is need of an all out frontal
intellectual war with a view to eliminating confusion and haziness of ideas. The
conscientious citizens, the civil society forums and the media should play a
positive role.
The political parties and the
civil society in the North-East should ensure that (i) the State governments
properly deliver; (ii) blame game - blaming Delhi for every local failure, as
for example, the failure of the State governments to pay salaries of their
oversized workforce on the name of Centre’s ‘lack of concern’ – stops;
(iii) local and intra-regional conflicts, as far as possible, are resolved
peacefully and democratically with local/regional initiative, (iv) ethnic
cleansing is stopped; (v) inter-tribal and inter-communal hatred is discouraged.
The combined strength of the
police force of the states of the region large. They should play greater and
effective role in controlling insurgency and violence so that need for and
dependence on army and paramilitary forces is reduced to the minimum.
The Centre and the States should
see that the problems related to ethnicity, insurgency and illegal migration
should be speedily solved. Growth of infra-structure in the region needs to be
prioritized.
Reference
1. Hutton, The Angami
Nagas, p. 4.
2. Ibid, p.24.
3. Anthony D. Smith,
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Martin Robertson Oxford, 1979, p. viii.
4. Ghai, Autonomy and
Ethnicity, p.4; quoted by Sushil K. Pillai, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) in ‘Ethnicity,
autonomy and Governance, Faultline, Vol. 10, p. 31.
5. Dalton, Descriptive
Ethnology of Bengal.
6. Faultline, Vol. 14,
p. 73.
7. Charles Chasie, The
Naga Imbroglio, p. 19.
8.