Dialogue  October-December, 2006 , Volume 8 No. 2

Ethnicity and Insurgency in India’s North-East

B.B. Kumar

Background

When the freedom dawned, the North-East region of the country had the State of Assam and two Princely States of Manipur and Tripura. It was widely known as Assam. The phrase ‘North-East’ got wide currency only after the re-organization of the region and liberation of Bangladesh. Today, we have seven states in the North-East, if we exclude Sikkim, which joined the North-East Council recently, and is separated from the rest of the region by the North Bengal districts.

The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution made provisions for the tribal autonomy in the Hill districts of Assam in the form of Autonomous District Councils (ADCs). Initially, there were only four autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in the entire region. Today, Mizoram, which was only a district of Assam and had an Autonomous District Council, completed the journey from a district through the Union Territory status to the Statehood, has four ADCs within it for Chakmas, Lakhers, Pawis and the Hmars. The Brus (Reangs) are even now continuing their autonomy demand in Mizoram.

Prior to 1947, there was hardly any forum in the North-East demanding secession or autonomy, except Naga National Council (NNC). Mizo Union was for keeping Mizo Hills as a district of Assam in India. Even Naga National Council resolved in 1946 to keep Naga Hills as a district in Assam within India. Initially, Phizo was forced to leave Naga National Council and moderate voice continued to be heard from NNC platform. Later on he became the leader of the outfit and NNC became the platform for demanding autonomy for the Nagas.

Initially, the NNC (and its creation Nagaland Federal Government, NFG) in Nagaland and the Communist outfit of Hijam Irabot Singh in Manipur were the only insurgent outfits in the North-East; today there number - including the dormant and withered away ones - may exceed a hundred. The list of the terrorist outfits given in ‘Annexure I’ is in no way exhaustive.

Historical Background

The Britishers sowed the seeds of separateness and secessionism in the region. Their policy of gradual segregation of the tribals and non-tribals, hills and the plains; segregation of the tribal population by introduction of the “Inner Line Regulation”, creation of “non-regulated”, “backward” and “excluded” areas/tracts was able to break centuries of historical, cultural, social and religious continuum and connectedness, The colonial theories/myths – the myth of race, core-fringe conflict, isolation – colonial mis-interpretation of history and culture further deepened the impact. The lies of exploitation and hegemony increased the suspicion of the segregated population. Like rest of India, colonial education and left ideology – as in Manipur - weakened nationalist feeling. Non-participation in freedom movement in many areas due to segregation was an added factor. Over and above, there was a colonial design, such as the Coupland Plan to separate the hills of India and Myanmar, and to make it a Crown colony.

Historically, the insurgency in Nagaland developed in above-mentioned colonial background. The British came in contact of the Nagas after their occupation of upper Assam, and Cachar. The Naga inhabited areas were gradually and reluctantly incorporated in Assam, The Naga turbulence was gradually controlled and Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills districts was able to win over the Nagas. The Naga Club was established in Kohima with some employees of the Deputy Commissioner’s office, a few village chiefs and some others in 1918. Its members submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission. Out of 20 signatories of the same, 15 were from the Angami tribe, two Kacha Nagas and one each from the Sema, Lotha, Rengma and Kuki tribes. Workwise, one was head interpretor, 8 interpretors, one peshkar, three masters/teachers, one doctor, one potdar, one treasurer, one sub-overseer, two clerks and one Chaprasi. The Lotha and Ao Tribal Councils were established in 1923 and 1928 respectively. The Naga Hills District Tribal Council (NHDTC) was formed in April 1945 under the guidance of the Deputy Commissioner, C.R. Pawsey, who was knighted and awarded M.C. later on. This very organization was renamed Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) which spearheaded Naga insurgency under the leadership of Angami Zapu Phizo in mid-1950s.

The NNC made a demand of the right of self-determination for the Nagas based on the following:  
         
(i)   Ethnic distinctiveness,
        
(ii)   Distinct social life, way of living, laws and customs, etc.,
       
(iii)   Different religion: Christianity and Animism.

While Phizo demanded separation of Nagaland from India, started rebellion; the moderate Nagas demanded the formation of Union Territory merging Naga Hills district of Assam and Tuensang Division of the then NEFA; and then a full-fledged state within Indian Union. The Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA, a Union Territory) was given to the Nagas in 1957 as desired by the ‘First Naga People’s Convention’. There were two more Naga People’s Conventions, which wanted full-fledged Statehood. Nagaland, the 16th State of the Indian Union was inaugurated by the then President of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan on 1st December 1963. Parallel to the above, the activities of Phizo continued. He was instrumental in the creation of underground ‘Federal Government of Nagaland’ and ‘Naga Army’. Nagaland developed as the epicentre of insurgency in the North-East. Ethnicity linked problem spread throughout Northeast region.

Origin of Insurgency in the North-East

As stated above, the insurgency originated in the Naga Hills district of Assam. NNC was the outfit and Phizo, the leader of the insurgent activities. The inept handling of the Naga insurgency resulted into the proliferation of insurgent activities in the entire region and the number of insurgent outfits continued to increase.

Growth of Insurgency in the North-East

The formation of Nagaland sent unhealthy signals throughout the North-East region. leading to destabilization of Assam state and the Assamese society. It adversely affected Manipur’s situation also. The reasons are:            l   Economic and demographic viability criteria was waved for the creation of Nagaland State.
          
l   The expenditure for the development and maintenance of the state machinery was given from the 
                Consolidated Fund of India. The new State was not given the burden to mobilize resources.            l   The huge flow of funds after Statehood created resource-rich area in Nagaland and 
                resource-poor areas in its neighbourhood
in Assam and Manipur.
          
l   Big states were replicated in Nagaland creating unprecedented avenues for appointments and 
                promotions for the educated lot.
          
l   The Naga Hills district of Assam had five Assembly constituencies; the new State had 52, and 
                then 60 MLSs, instead of five, majority of them managing to become ministers.

          
l   The above-mentioned scenario was tempting for others. Following two unhealthy signals 
                emerged
in the North-East:
               
-that the social distancing pays, 
               
-that the violence pays.
               
These signals were never effectively countered. They also wanted all that the Nagas got by following 
                their path. Laldenga and Mizo National Front followed Phizo and NNC; followed the path of 
                secessionist insurgency; Mizoram State was created. Laldenga and MNF were the role models for 
                Bijoy Kumar Hrankhawl and Tripura Upajati Juva Samiti. There was upsurge of ethnic identity 
                claims resulting into social distancing leading to the demands for secession or autonomy.
          
l   The Manipuris were psychologically hurt. They were ancient kingdom were to be satisfied with UT 
                status; Nagas had State. The demand of greater Nagalim has further aggrevated the problem in 
                Manipur.

The net result is that the insurgency continued to grow; number of insurgent outfits has almost touched three digit mark; the society and the state is destabilized.

The insurgency in Nagaland persists; Nagas link flow of funds from Delhi and insurgency.; they want to be superior to other states status-wise. Udayon Misra has observed: “Every government in Nagaland since the State was formed, has had some stake in having the insurgency continue. Among other things, the insurgency has always been a convenient lever to secure greater benefits from the Centre.” (Udayon Misra, The Periphert Strikes Back , Shimla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 2000, p. 55.).

The Nagas have psychological problem also; they want to be superior to others status-wise. Otherwise, greater autonomy is not going to benefit common Nagas. Many view it as a step forward towards the ultimate aim of secession.

Kinds of Insurgent Outfits

There are three kinds of insurgent outfits in the North-East region depending on their demands. They are (i) secessionist outfits, (ii) outfits demanding separate state within India, and (iii) those demanding Autonomous District Councils (ADCs). All most all the insurgent outfits in the North-East region, starting with NNC, based their secessionist demands on separate ethnic identity assertion.

Insurgent outfits, such as: ULFA, NSCN, UNLF, Revolutionary People’s Front (political wing of People’s Liberation Army) and many others aim at secession from India. Hhynniewtrep National Liberation Council, HNLC wants to transform Meghalaya into a state exclusively for the Khasis. Achik National Volunteer Council, ANVC and

Garo National Council, GNC want a state exclusively for the Garos. Many organizations, such as Bru National Liberation Front, BNLF demand autonomy within Mizoram under the provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Constitution. Most of the secessionist outfits have armed wings.

ATTF: demands separate tribal homeland. The demands of the outfits like ALMA, Hyniewtrep Volunteer Council (HVC), Hmar People’s Convention (HPC) come within the Constitution of India. Kuki National Assembly (1947; Kuki Inpi) was revived in 1992 to provide relief during Kuki Naga conflict. The Kuki National Organization (1992), and its armed wing, KNA, aim at having a Kuki state within Myanmar. The aim of Kuki National Front, KNF is to get Kukiland within India. Its armed cadres were trained by Kachin Independence Army of Myanmar (KIA) and it has link with ULFA. 

Separatist/Secessionist Ideology:

The separatist/secessionist ideologies in the North-East are of the following type: 
          
i.   Ethnic
         
ii.   Ideological/leftist/Communist, and
        
iii.   Religious.

Many insurgent outfits combine the above-mentioned ethnic traits. The NNC combined ethnic (Naga ethnicity) and religious (Christian); the NSCN combined Naga ethnicity, Christianity and Socialism/Scientific Socialism/Communism. ULFA combines ethnic and Communist/Scientific Socialism factors and has religious linkages through ISI and Bangladesh intelligence. Most of the Manipuri outfits claim separation/secession on ethnic (Pan-Mongolian/ Mongolian/Meithei) and Communist ideological ground. The First two secessionist groups in the region, NNC under Phizo; and Revolutionary Nationalist Party (and its armed wing, Manipur Red Guards) under Hijam Irabot Singh emphasised on Ethnicity. The latter was also a Communist outfit.

People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Kangleipak Communist Party, (KCP), People’s Liberation Army (of Manipur; PLA), All Tripura People’s Liberation Organization (ATPLO), Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) combined ethnic identity with Scientific Socialism/Socialism/Communism. Ethnic extremism in the North-East was started by Phizo. Manipur has old history of left extremism; Irabot Singh was a communist. But the secessionist left extremism got boosted up due to the activities of PLA under Biseshwar Singh. He combined left-extremism with anti-Mayang (anti-outsider) and pan-Mongoloid sentiments. NSCN and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) under the leadership of Bishwamohan Debbarma promoted Christian terrorism. NSCN and NLFT worked for forcible conversion to Christianity. These outfits were responsible for the religious oppression of the Hindus and Buddhists in Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura respectively. Jamatiya Hoda and its leaders, to a large extent, were able to control NLFT run religious terrorism. NSCN’s religious terrorism continued unabated. 

An Insight into Naga Ethnicity/Naga Identity

An understanding of the Naga ethnicity and identity formation is necessary so that to understand the insurgency related proliferation problem in the region.

As mentioned above, Phizo based his autonomy demand on distinct Naga social life, ethnicity, way of living, laws and customs. In reality, it is difficult to distinguish the Nagas from the other communities of the region in one hand and their homogeneity on the other. Hutton wrote:

“If not impossible, it is exceedingly difficult to propound any test by which a Naga tribe can be distinguished from other Assam or Burma tribes, which are not Nagas.1

The intra-Naga heterogeneity, on the other hand, is unimaginable. Hutton further writes: about the feature of the Angami Nagas:

“It would be impossible to give any general description of the type of the Angami features, as it varies from village to village and even from house to house to remarkable degree. The flattened nose and slightly oblique eye of a decidedly Mongolian type may be seen side by side with a straightness of eyes and nose that might be purely Aryan.2

W.C. Smith has listed 14 traits of the Tibeto-Burmans – head-hunting, dormitory for the young men, house on piles, disposal of the dead on platforms, tribal marriage customs, betel chewing, aversion to milk, lack of political organization, double sylinder forge, loin-loom, hexagonal shields, residence in hilly regions and jhum cultivation. These are not the common markers for the Nagas. Anthony Smith, in his definition of the ethnic community, enumerate the marker of ethnic community as “a named human population with a myth of common ancestory, shared memories and cultural elements, link to a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity.”3. The language, race, religion and colour are the markers, according to Ghai.4. It needs mention that the Nagas do not have common myth of origin and migration. They lack common language, identical social and cultural elements and all the markers enumerated above. To talk of the common memory of the Naga tribes is absurd, as they did not know even the names of the tribes except for the few and had the memory of only the mutual feud and enmity only 17 years before voicing of their autonomy demands in 1929. The deplorable state of the knowledge of the signatories of the Simon Commission memorandum about the Nagas comes to light from the following quote from the memorandum:

“Our country within the administered area consists of more than eight tribes, quite different from one another with different languages which can not be understood by each other, and there are more Tribes outside the administrated area which are not known at present. We have no unity among us and it is really the British Government that is holding us together now.”

It is clear from the above that Nagas lack ethnic and socio-cultural identity, as is the case with some other tribes/groups also, and as such any anthropological basis of Naga identity is a fluid one as different communities constantly come in and out of it. At one time, even, Kacharis, Kukis, Abors5, Karbis, Nepalis,6 Khamtis and Singphos7 were included in the list of the Nagas, whereas Manipuri Nagas, including Muivah’s own tribe, Tangkhul was excluded from the same.8 Today Muivah is continuing his ethnic cleansing drive against the Kukis forgetting the fact that one of the Kukis signed Simon Commission Memorandum as a Naga.

Phizo propagated that Nagaland had never been a part of India, that only the British conquered it. Therefore with the lapse of the suzerainty, the Nagas ipso-facto became independent. The truth is that various tribes of the Nagas remained under the Ahom9, Meithei10 and the Kachari kings. The Eastern Nagas remained under Singhpho Chiefs. These facts cannot be ignored and therefore it is difficult to understand the “unique history” of the Nagas claimed by Muivah.

Anals, Lamkhangs and Monsangs belong to Kuki-Chin group and use Kuki-Chin languages as mother-tongues. Now they claim Naga identity.11 Muivah is indulging in forced identity formation not only by ethnic and communist terrorism, but also by religious terrorism by forced conversion to Christianity. NSCN-IM has the slogan of ‘Nagaland for Christ’. The eastern Nagas of Mynmar have closer affiliations with the Kachins; NSCN-IM had to forcibly establish themselves among them in some of the areas as in Kesan Chanlam, and convert them to Christianity. The book of Bertil Lintner, Land of Zade, which points out these facts, is reportedly banned by Muivah 12 The tribes of Tirap and Arunachal Pradesh are being forcibly converted in similar way to Christianity.13

There always existed historical, cultural, social and religious ‘connectedness’ between the hills and the plains of the North-East region of the country. The British worked to break the same by isolating the hills and plains of the region by segregation of different communities and the sub-regions. They introduced ‘Inner Line regulation’, created ‘non-regulated; ‘backward’ and ‘excluded areas/tracts: prevented freedom movement to penetrate and get strengthened. The British wanted to separate the hills of North-East India and Myanmar and create a separate ‘Crown Colony’. Their plan, known as Coupland plan, could not succeed, as the freedom came too early. However, the over all impact of the colonial British functionaries on selected tribal intelligentsia was responsible for sowing the seeds of separatism in the North-East.

The British gave twist to the interpretation of the history and culture of the region. The myth of race, hypothesis of core-fringe conflict; myths of isolation, hegemony of and exploitation had no basis. But their over all impact created suspicion in the mind of one section of our people for the others. A grudge that tribes were neglected, that they were exploited by their neighbours in the plains were completely baseless colonial fabrications which created divisive mind-set. The impact of these colonial theories and myths and the colonial education, weakening of the traditions and the traditional values were responsible for creating mercenaries out of the half-educated ones not only in NE region but in the entire country.

Factors responsible for strengthening Insurgency:

Some of the factors responsible for unrestricted growth and strengthening of insurgency/insurgent outfits are given below:

Insurgency-Politician Nexus

It is well-known fact that many insurgent secessionist outfits in the North-East, especially in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Nagaland could grow and get strong due to insurgent-politician nexus. ULFA “was able to become a large outfit primarily due to the tacit support provided by the first AGP regime under Prafulla Kumar Mahanta”. The outfit was running a parallel government in Assam during that period.14 This was described as “One of the classic example of culpable inaction on the part of the State government” by Assam’s former Governor D.D. Thakur.15 Mr. B.P. Chaliha, the then Chief Minister of Assam and a shrewd politician, ignoring the serious implications for national unity and security, released Laldenga from jail in 1963, taking him to be potential ally for neutralizing the growing influence of the Mizo Union in the Mizo Hills district. Laldenga continued his anti-national activities and the nation paid the price for the short-sighted party politics of Mr. Chaliha16.

Lt Gen V.K. Nayar (Retd.), the Governor of Manipur & acting Governor of Nagaland accused S.C. Jamir of patronizing NSCN-K.17 Gen. Nayyar in his special report to the President of India wrote about S.C. Jamir:

“With Shri Jamir supporting NSCN (K), tribal alignments with Aos, Konyaks, Phoms firmly with him NSCN (K), and Semas, Angamis and other Southern Tribes against him and NSCN(I) have already fermented”18

 NSCN (IM) has increased its influence internally. This process was helped considerably by the defeat of the Congress(I) led Jamir government in the last elections It is alleged that with the connivance of the then NDA governmentt.at the Centre, which gave the NSCN-IM cadres free hand to intimidate and influence the results. It allowed the NSCN-IM to drive out the moderate leadership from the Naga HOHO and other civil society establishments. This short-sighted strategy has given the secessionist NSCN-IM a clout beyond its support base, mainly based on fear.

Gen. Nayar wrote about Rishang Keishing in his report:

“NSCN (I) and its sympathizers and collaborators over the past few months have surreptitiously revived and propagated successfully the old theme of South Nagaland by exploiting the sentiment of Naga identity and interest. In this, Shri Rishang Keishing, Dy. Chief Minister, Marung Makunga, Minister of State and A.S. Arthur, ex-MLA (all of Congress-I) have played a dubious role with the help of over-ground front organizations of United Naga Council, Tangkhul Long and tribal youth and student organizations (.) A combination of Naga sentiment, threat and Kuki baiting have been effectively employed to dominate Naga inhabited areas of four of the five hill districts of Ukhrul, Chandel, Senapati and Tamenglong (.) In real terms it is domination of NSCN (I) and Tangkhuls” (.)19

In Manipur, “almost every party are busy cultivating underground groups to be one-up on their political adversaries as also to strengthen their bargaining position vis-ŕ-vis the Central government, while paying lip-service to their nationalistic credentials. Constitutional perversity and political bickerings have crossed new limits. Political opportunism has led to erosion and breakdown of democratic institutions.20 It is alleged that some political leaders of Manipur maintained close links with secessionist terrorist outfits like PLA and NSCN.21 Evidences are not lacking about the complex web of collusion between substantially criminalized terrorist outfits and various political parties of Manipur. At least five ministers of Nipamacha Singh government, as per a Union Ministry of Home Affairs Report, had direct links with terrorists of the NSCN-K, PLA, UNLF, KYKL (Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup and ZRA (Zomi Revolutionary Army).22 Parliament was informed about the receipts of Rs. three lakhs by UNLF from former Manipur Chief Minister Nipamacha Singh and former Speaker Chandramani Singh of Manipur Legislative Assembly.23 Two Kuki National Front terrorists were arrested at the official residence of the then Transport Minister of Manipur, Haokholet Kipgen by the security force personnel on November 28, 2000. This led Central Government to announce an investigation into clandestine alliance between the politicians and terrorist outfits.24

In Tripura, the seed of insurgency was sown by the Communist Party of India (CPI) under the leadership of Dashrath Deb during 1948-51 as a part of the larger movement to ‘liberate India from its then ruling classes.’ The political parties – Congress and CPI/CPM – have developed stable nexus over the years after independence. The insurgent outfits target the civilian population during elections as a part of their strategy to help their patron political parties. Out of the two most criminalized terrorist outfits, “the NLFT is said to have close link with the Congress (I) while the ATTF is aligned with the ruling left front.”25 Here it needs mention that it goes to the credit of the electorate of Tripura as elsewhere in the country, that they go and cast their votes inspite of the threat of the terrorist outfits, who act as vote-mercenaries. It is alleged that the terrorists inspired mass killings during elections helped the formation ministries in Tripura.

Pre-poll violence was witnessed during December 1982, before January 1983 Assembly elections. Violence unleashed on non-tribals before 1988 elections by the TNV, under the leadership of Bijoy Kumar Hrankhawl, took the toll of more than hundred lives, and turned the poll-eve atmosphere in favour of Congress, as alleged. The Congress-TUJS coalition government was formed and Hrangkhawl came overground. The CPI-M, then supported the formation of All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF) so that to keep away the Congress from the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous Tribal Council, (TTAADC). ATTF continued to kill selectively the leaders of Congress and TUJS during the rule of Congress-TUJS coalition and brief President’s rule period. The killings before April 1993 elections resulted into the Left Front’s victory in the elections. A section of the ATTF, under the leadership of Lalit Debbarma, surrendered. Another factions continued insurgent activities under the leadership of Ranajit Debbarma so that to reap the benefits of insurgency-politics nexus.26 It is alleged that NLFT sponsored a political front, the Indigenous People’ front of Tripura (IPFT) before April 30 and May 3, 2000 elections of TTAADC. The NLFT selectively killed 78 activists and leaders of the CPI-M after the notifications of the elections and 111 after the election. The NLFT backed IPFT came to power by winning 18 seats out of 30 for which the elections were held.27

The degenerate politics of the Congress and the CPI-M in Tripura is solely responsible for the continuance of the insurgency in that tiny state. The NLFT and ATTF are highly criminalized gangs. Though there are over thirty terrorist outfits in Tripura, the most powerful among them are NLFT and ATTF only. The others are either just rag-tag criminal gangs or are dormant.28 The terrorist outfits of Tripura have transformed abduction into a lucrative industry. Tripura accounts for 70 per cent of the abductions of the North-Eastern region.

Arunachal Pradesh suffers mostly due to spill over of the terrorist activities of the NSCN-IM and NSCN-K. The state is not free from terrorism-politics nexus. I Wanglat, MLA demanded CBI or judicial enquiry in June 2000 to ascertain abetting and sponsoring of insurgency in Tirap and Changlang districts. He further demanded that the political leaders found guilty should be arrested and asked to relinquish office.29 Former Chief Minister Gegong Apang alleged on April 6, 2001 that some ministers and MLAs were harbouring and abetting insurgents in the State, and had direct links with NSCN-K, and NSCN-IM in Tirap and Changlang.30 NSCN-K, with sizeable presence in Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh had established a reciprocal relationship with Chief Minister Mukut Mithi’s Arunachal Congress.31 As stated earlier, ULFA received unchallenged political patronage in Assam, which made the outfit most powerful. The attitude of the first AGP government towards the outfit may be judged from the fact that Bhrigu Kumar Phukan, the then Home Minister described ULFA as being ‘from among us’32

Insurgency-Bureaucracy Links

The reports of the collusion of government servants, including the senior IAS officers with the insurgent outfits comes to light from time to time. It was alleged that S.K. Tiwari, Commissioner, General Administration Department, Assam and P. Verma, Secretary, Transport maintained direct links with ULFA. It was reported that Verma even met the ULFA General Secretary, Golap Barua and foreign secretary, Raju Barua, before their arrest in Calcutta. The former was carrying an identity card issued to him by Verma.33 H.N. Das, Chief Secretary, Assam wrote to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to take action against Chandra Das, Commissioner, Panchayat & Rural Development, and Food & Civil Supply, Education Commissioner, Prafulla Kumar Sarma and Revenue Commissioner, P.C. Misra for their alleged involvement and direct connection with the ULFA.34 There may be many reasons for such deviant behaviour of the administrative officers. It may be due to fear or due to acting on taking a cue from their over-conciliating political bosses. But a large number of them remained firm and did not yield to the threat/terror and many such officers were killed.

Collusion with bureaucracy 13/128

In Manipur, many officers resisting terrorist demands were shot. The Director Tourism, an IAS officers did not agree to pay ransom, and was shot. The Registrar of Cooperative was abducted and severely injured for not paying ransom. The Director of Education also suffered. The Divisional Engineer, telephones did not waive the bills of two PCOs operated by NSCN-IM and PLA, and was killed. The Chief Engineer, Loktak Project was killed by KYKL insurgents on January 12, 2000. As reported, his security was withdrawn on an unwritten order to the Director general of Police.35

In Manipur, the militant outfits were successful in subverting the Public distribution system through their linkages with the politicians. The tankers of kerosene oil, petrol, and diesel were diverted from the dealers and sold in the black market by all militant groups. In many cases contracts were procured by unqualified members of militant groups at gunpoint. Only 50 percent of the work is executed, but Executive Engineers and their seniors are forced to enter full execution of the work in the measurement book and to make full payment for the half executed work. Half of sum goes to the caufers of the militant group. Such extortions continue in all other departments and in other states also.36 Diverted rice from the public distribution system were partly supplied to the underground camps; partly supplied to the black-markets. The PLA and UNLF sold rice and kerosene oil at very low rates in the villages around their camps in Churachandpur and Chandel districts and thus aquired a ‘Robin Hood’ image. The people in Imphal were getting a liter or two per month per family against the quota of five, whereas the villagers were hardly getting any.37

Initially, the politicians started siphoning or large-scale diversion of development funds in collusion with spineless bureaucrats. After that the insurgent outfits intervened and started taking a major share of the deals. The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of Manipur, mostly run by the politicians on the names of their hanger-on, use only a trickle of the funds, approximately five per cent, for the real work, such as the housing for the rural poor, watershed projects. Rest of the money received by the NGOs from the Central government as grants is siphoned out.38 In such a case, these schemes also came under the extensive network of extortion enriching the terrorist coffers. The situation worsened most during the People’s Front government in Manipur of 2000, when the ‘nexus between the PLA and the UNLF with the politicians reached its peak.’39

Many Central leaders have warned the State governments of the NE region in the past against payments of the development funds to the insurgents. Venkiah Naidu, Union Rural Development Minister, during the meeting of the Rural Development Ministers of the region at Shillong on June 14, 2001, warned that “the centre would stop disbursing rural development funds to those States, where a bulk of the funds go to the coffers of the extremist outfits.”40 Such warnings have been given to the NGOs also.

* Partisan dealing of the central Agencies with the insurgent outfits was reported by the Governor, Gen. V.K. Nayar; it to a large extent contributed in escalation of divisive politicians of Manipur (Nayar, V.K., p. 101.

Insurgent-Police Collusion

Some cases of the collusion between the insurgent groups and the police have also been reported from time to time. The Nagaland Armed Police lost 96 weapons and large quantities of amminition during July 1995 during two raids by NSCN-IM at Peren and Ranga Pahar. It was possible due to collusion between the local police and the insurgents, according to the Army sources. Lt. Gen. O.P. Kaushik of the Eastern Commend of the Army, in a Press Conference in Calcutta in July 1995, accused the local police, state government officials and politicians for their collusion with the underground groups.41

There were cases of desertion from the service, collusion and illegal arms sale to the ULFA by policemen. Two policemen disappeared with their arms and the ULFA insurgents, they were guarding, and joined ULFA camps. Chief Minster Saikia issued a statement after this incident that 500 police constables recruited in Assam during AGP regime between 1985 and 1987 had ULFA links and four of them were actually being trained in ULFA camps in the Kachin state in Myanmar.42 It was reported that higher police department officials were in possession of a good number of documents, reports and videocassettes revealing the intensity of the nexus. As reported, policemen participated in valleyball matches with ULFA cadres, attended shraddha ceremony of slain ULFA insurgents; and imparted martial art training to their cadres in Upper Assam. (Patriot, New Delhi, August 24, 2001). There was media report of the sale of arms to the ULFA from an armory in Sibsagar district by two constables in September 1992.43 The nexus included some higher police officers also. It was reported that ULFA received prior information about army raid during operation Bajrang from a top IB officer, having cordial relation with the outfit.44

The Media Support

Media coverage in India does not provide in-depth object information about insurgent outfits and their activities. In many cases, we find coverage sympathetic to the insurgents. A large section of our intellectuals and mediamen share the ideology with the ideological terrorists. Many share the confusions of the ethnic insurgents. Unfortunately, our mediamen have scant understanding of the North-East. Many of them create havoc when they attempt at doctrinairing on behalf of the terrorists. Parag Kumar Das was one such journalist. He was the editor of the Assamese journal journal Budhwar. He was regarded as the one of the finest theoreticians of ULFA. Weekly Budhwar acted as a front for the ULFA. ULFA’s Publicity Secretary answered queries and explained the policies of the outfit in almost every issue of the weekly. Das wrote a booklet Swadhinatar Prastab, in which he emphasised that the Assamese have always been ethnically different from the rest of India. According to him, the Assamese are closer to their ‘Mongolian brothers’ than to the Indo-Aryan ones. Assamese ‘socio-cultural ethos’ are different from those of the Indians. Das brings the case of well-known Vaishnavite saint, Sankaradeva and writes that being a fish-eater, Sankaradeva was not a part of the ‘Indian socio-cultural ethos’. Das did not know that all category of Indians, including the Brahmins from Bengal and Mithila to Konkan coast, eat fish. Parag Kumar Das, and the supporters of secessionist insurgency like him base their anti-national arguments on unverified simplistic and selective facts ignoring the commonality of pan-Indian socio-cultural traits and over emphasizing the differences. Two journalists of Assam, Rajib Bora of Sentinel and Manjit Mahanta of Ajir Asom were accused by the Government and arrested on November 25 and 26, 1991 for running errand for the ULFA serving as low-level couriers, using their office telephones to send and receive message, type, photocopy and distribute ULFA’s statements among other journalists, etc.45 Many news-papers of Assam, published from Guwahati and other districts, used to publish ULFA Press Release without changing even a word. When there was mass surrender of the ULFA cadres in 1992, then the editor of Ami, an Assamese journal wrote: “ULFA did not drop from the sky, nor is ULFA a wild animal. ULFA is our child. (The members of) ULFA are our brothers, they are our kin. (We must understand) why they have chosen the path of the jungle.”46 These amply illustrate the emotional attachment of a section of the Press towards ULFA and the latter’s sway over the media. The insurgents in other states also use the media for their benefit in more or less the same way.

It will be oversimplification to say that the press in general supports terrorist/insurgent outfits in the North-East. There are many in the media who do not toe to the line of thinking of the latter; are pressurized by them and work under severe strain. Many in the media have deep understanding of the region and its problems; its links with the country in socio-cultural-historical continuum frame. India is neither an ‘imaginary state’ for them, nor the ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ is anathema. They are not enchanted and romanticized by the ‘revolutionary’ image of the ULFA, NSCN, RNP, PREPAK, TNV, KCP and the like. But the task of the media is difficult. Media men are threatened and even killed. The ‘messengers are in peril’ as Patricia Mukhim asserts. She rightly says: “North-East India is afflicted by two very pernicious forces both of which want to either gobble up media space or to gag the media. The former demand that their statements be reported verbatim. The latter want media to look the other way while they commit a crime. Both are difficult propositions for any media person worth his salt.”47 Recently four journalists of Assam received warnings from ULFA for their for their truthful reporting and analysis. We are happy and proud to have such journalists who continue to face such challenges.

 As always happens whenever the country tries to reach at some sort of understanding with, be it Pakistan, USA, NSCN-IM or ULFA, planted stories appear in the media, advising New Delhi to be either more flexible, show more commitment, or to reject any proposal outright. The media, thus creates haziness and confusion, fails to play positive role.

Support from Human Rights Organizations and NGOs to the Insurgents

The insurgents of North-East, and elsewhere also, receive overt or covert support from a large number of ‘Human Rights Organizations’ and the organizations of the Civil society. The open support and sympathy of Human rights activists, Naga Students Federation and many NGOs for the Naga insurgents is well-known fact. As reported, the Centre was “contemplating suspension of all funds to Manipur based NGOs, as several of them act in collusion with the terrorists.”48 

Support from Foreign Human Rights Groups/NGOs

NSCN and other terrorist/insurgent outfits continue to get external support.49 NSCN-IM has simultaneously expanded its activities outside India. While India failed to send representatives and NGOs to Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization at Hague, and at the same time contest the entry of NSCN-IM as a member of the same, the outfit got an opportunity to propagate its cause in international forums and was able to open avenues for arms and ammunition in SE Asia, Europe and America. Flemish support group for indigenous people (KWIA) also made a ‘Declaration on Nagaland’, committed itself to “the inherent right of the Naga people to self-determination and independence.”

 Many fronts of the insurgent outfits, such as U.K. based Assam Watch, an alleged front of ULFA, work in U.K. and other countries. It needs mention that the Assam Watch sponsored ULFA’s chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa and its general secretary Anup Chetia to attend a meeting of the UN Sub-Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous people held in July 1997 at Geneva; they fled only after the Interpol issued Red Corner Alert notice against them. Organizations and the individuals attend the meetings of the United Nations Working Group of Indigenous People (UNWGIP) and discuss internal matter of India.

External Help

The reports of the help received by various insurgent outfits from foreign agencies and Governments pour in from time to time. These outfits receive fund, arms, arms training, and shelter; and are provided passport and visas to the leaders of the outfits to enable them to travel in different countries. These outfits received help from China, Paistan and Bangladesh, Pakistan’s ISI and Bangladesh Directorate of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) from time to time. Camps of various insurgent groups are safely sheltered in Bangladesh. Such camps were located in Myanmar, and for some years even in Bhutan. There have been allegations of NSCN’s link even with al-Qaeda. . Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) and Kachin Independent Army (KIA) under Bransen in Myitkyina in Northern Myanmar used to provide arms and training to various outfits on payment. Its link with NSCN was established in 1985. The People’s Liberation Army of Manipur has also link with the KIO. ULFA joined later on in 1985.Training facilities for ULFA cadres was arranged by ISI in the camps of Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. ISI and DGFI facilitated the arms procurement for Indian insurgent outfits from South-East Asian arms market.

Networking between the Insurgent Outfits

The NSCN-IM increased its strength by the establishment of new insurgent organizations and networking with the old and the new. It helped in the formation of NDFB (National democratic Front of Bodoland), BLT (Bodo Liberation Tigers; formerly, Bodo Liberation Tiger Force), KNV (Karbi National Volunteers) DHD (Dima Halim Daoga), ANVC (Achik National Voluneer Council), NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura). The NSCN-IM sells arms to these outfits and provides arms training to their cadre. It receives 60:40 shares from the collections out of extortions, kidnappings, taxes, bank robberies. United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) also received arms and training from the NSCN. The former helped in the formation of Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO). ULFA’s condition to the Rajbongshi leadership and to All Kamtapur Students Union (SKSU) to provide arms training was that they form a secessionist outfit. As a result of their agreement, KamtapurLiberation Organization (KLO) was formed. It provided arms and arms training to the cadres of the outfit, and used to receive share from the collections out of extortions, kidnappings by the KLO or during their jount operations. ULFA cultivated its links with like-minded other outfits also. Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl and his outfits continued to receive help and training from Mizo National Front.

Other Factors: There are many other factors, which strengthen the insurgent/terrorist outfits, especially during the formative days. Some of them are:  
        
(i)   Robinhood image of the terrorist outfits: Many insurgent groups acquire Robinhood image and 
                become popular among the masses. ULFA’s steps against corruption, drug-trafficking, illegal trade 
                in rhino horns, molestation of women, prostitution and private tuition, etc gave them popular 
                legitimacy and strength. Manipuri outfits distributed rice and K. oil on cheaper rates among the 
                villagers around their camps. This, however, does not continue for long as the masses become tired 
                due to prolonged violence and extortion or due to some unpopular act of the outfit. ULFA’s 
                Robinhood image was broken after Sanjoy Ghosh’s killing.50
       
(ii)   There is lack of proper perspective among the politicians; they seldom look at the problem 
                from long-term perspective. Governments/politicians allow terrorist organizations to consolidate; 
                start peace process when the outfits need time to re-organize; they often Ignoring growth of 
                anti-national secessionist forces The weaknesses in handling terrorism give them strength.51
      
(iii)   Non-percolation of development benefits leads to alienation among the masses. The masses, at a 
                time start believing that the insurgents may bring positive change.
      
(iv)   Simplistic approach of tackling insurgency through show of force; taking it only as law & 
                order problem;
talking in terms of deployment of army/para-military forces/modernization of arms 
                only exhibits our lack of understanding of the problem. Then failure of the approach leads to panic 
                response.
         (v)   Weak intellectual front; inability to fight intellectual war strengthens insurgent cause as people 
                start believing the myths and the propaganda of the insurgents. .vi. Cases of security forces 
                remaining un-alert even after timely warning,
as happened during attack on Oinam camp in 
                Manipur, has come to light. Recently, the seizure of 73 gigabytes of classified defence information 
                carefully stored in 40 CDs and two laptops from I. Mani Singh, a “deputy intelligence officer” of the 
                PLA an insurgent outfit of Manipur, points towards our flopped security net and the militants going 
                high tech. This is an equally disturbing feature of our lapse.52

Faction Fights

A permanent trait of the insurgent outfits of the North-East is factionalism. This trait is even more prominent among Maoist and Islamist insurgents. The main reason of factionalism in the insurgent outfits is the personality clash and dictatorial/intolerant attitude of the insurgent leaders. Sakhrie was mercilessly butchered by Phizo when he differed from him. After NNC accepted Indian sovereignty and signed Shillong accord, in 1975, a splinter group named of NNC Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formed in 1980. The NSCN split in 1988 into two factions; one led by Isaak Swu and T. Muiva, and the other by S.S. Khaplang. NNC was also divided into two factions after the death of Phizo. In Manipur, both PLA and PREPAK were formed by one time members of UNLF. PREPAK has two factions led by Salam Nabachandra alias Khomba and Meriaba respectively. The two factions of KCP are led by Yendrembam Ibohanbi, the president of the United outfit, and by Mutum Ibopishak. A group of UNLF is led by Oken Singh. In Manipur, only PLA did not suffer from factionalism and split. A very large section of ULFA has surrendered to the Government and is presently known as SULFA. The Bodo insurgent outfits also could not remain free from this malady. The split and factionalism was seen in the insurgent outfits of Tripura also. ATTF and DHD split into Hindu and Christian factions. In many cases there is split on tribal lines.53

A very sad aspect of the factionalism among insurgent outfits is the internecine clash in which thousands of persons have lost their lives. The fratricidal war between NSCN-IM and NSCN-K continue unabated. A large number of Bodos have lost their lives in the fratricidal war between the BLT and NDFB54

Prominent Weaknesses of the Indian Insurgent Outfits

Certain weaknesses are inherent in Indian insurgent/terrorist outfits. Their leadership is dictatorial; the ethos are non-democratic. The military wing often dominates over the political wing. As reported about ULFA, “the individual members at the lower rungs has hardly any right to express his opinion”. The organization often throttles inner party democracy; violence is used in order to settled ‘personal scores’55 Lion share of coffers is operated by the leaders of ULFA without the knowledge of its cadres. The topmost rebel leaders lead lavish life style, which has earned them disrepute and the title of “silver screen’ rebels’56 It is pertinent to quote Sanjoy Hazarika in this case. He writes:

“The Assamese widened the description of guerrilla warfare in this region: from jungle camps and in uncertain income from villages – in the form of taxes levied by the Nagas and Mizos – the rebel movement soared to the five star culture”57 Money laundering by ULFA leaders has been a well-known fact.58 They have invested fhuge money in the industry in Bangladesh.

The other outfits, especially the NSCN-IM, is second to none in the traits mentioned above. Muivah and other insurgent leaders do not tolerate dissent, live lavishly. It is reported that the NSCN leaders have purchased property in Shillong.59

Lumpenisation of all the insurgent outfits is a well-known phenomenon due to the willing acceptance/recruitment of the criminals in their ranks. This is true in case of bigger outfits like ULFA also.60

The unprincipled about-turn stand of the ULFA on the issue of ‘Illegal Migration from Bangladesh’ is not viewed favorably by Assamese civil society. In reality, an Ulfa leader staying in Bangladesh is viewed as the “Enemy’s Friend’. Paresh Baruah, C-in-C of ULFA, who has 12 safe addresses in Dhaka, is known by ‘friendly’ names Kamaruj Zaman Khan and Zaman Bhai. Zaman Bhai is compelled to give his wife and two children also ‘friendly’ Bangladeshi names. None is convinced in Assam, and the rest of the country, that ULFA leader’s aim to create sovereign ‘xonar Asom’ by liberating it from and that of his host,61 Bangladesh to create ‘Greater Bangladesh’ converge. In reality, the people understand the rhetoric whether of an insurgent outfit or a political party. AGP wanted to form government with AUDF, whose whole agenda is to safeguard, nourish and expand the domain of illegal Bangladeshis and retention of the provisions of IMDT Act. The voting pattern changed during last Assam Assembly elections after AGP’s rhetoric. AGP wanted to form government with AUDF, whose whole agenda is to safeguard, nourish and expand the domain of illegal Bangladeshis and retention of the provisions of IMDT Act.

The people know that insurgency in the North-East is anti-people; it facilitates corruption; helps politicians, bureaucrats, government suppliers, criminals, extortionists in pocketing government funds; keeps perpetual resource crunch and does not allow the poorest of the poor from getting the benefits of development. The insurgents promote cleavage among communities; deepen Faultlines. People do not oppose the insurgents only due to fear of gun.

Ethnic clash in many parts of North-East region has assumed worrisome proportion. This has taken the form of ethnic cleansing in many areas such as in NSCN’s action against the Kukis in Manipur, anti-Santhal violence in Bodo areas. The clashes between the Karbis and Kacharis in Karbi-Anglong district, Kacharis and Hmars in North-Cachar Hills district of Assam, Mizos and Brus (Reangs) in Mizoram and many more used to cause concern and worry. NSCN-IM’s attempted towards ethnic cleansing of the Kukis started when the former’s interest of monopolizing the benefits of illicit trade through Moreh route came in clash with that of the Kukis.( Marwah 294-95) This led the chain of developments resulting into arming of Kukis and insurgency among Paites of Churachandpur district of Manipur.

Funding of Insurgent Outfits: Sources of the Funding of the insurgent are bank-robberies, extortion, pilferage of government funds, smuggling, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities..

Demise of India: ULFA’s Hope: ULFA’s hope of Swadhin Assam rests on the demise of India. This is in conformity with the thinking of the Islamist insurgents also.

Conflict Resolution

There have been many attempts towards conflict resolution in the region in the past. It included official conflict resolution and the civil society driven attempts for the same. The talk of the Central Government with the NSCN-IM is going on for some years. In Assam, the People’s Consultative Group (PCG) initiative has brought fruit; Central government and ULFA may talk directly and resolve the problem. However, caution is necessary as the insurgent outfits of the North-East are not known for honoring the agreements, be it the understanding with Naga moderate leaders leading to NHTA or Nagaland State formation or the Shillong Accord with the NNC, ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) signed with the outfits in Tripura and in many other places. The signing of MoU and surrenders lead us nowhere as a splinter group of the insurgents often revives the issue, gathers strength and the problem continues. As the tired Governments gradually concede their demands, the insurgents/outfits slowly move towards their goal.

In Assam, while at one hand PCG was trying to bring the Centre and ULFA together for direct talks, the spurt in violence by ULFA continued. Attempts are going on to get some ULFA leaders released from jail to facilitate talks. Such attempts failed earlier to bring result, as a released leader went to Dhaka not to return back. NSCN-IM, in all these years of ceasefire, continued to indulge in mobilizing arms and resources, recruiting cadres, extortion and violent activities. Its extortion activities continued even in Assam and bank dacoity in collusion with another terrorist outfit outside Nagaland. It was reported that NSCN-IM mobilized foreign trained cadres with sophisticated arms to prevent eviction of illegally settled persons in Assam. This outfit does not want any other outfit or civil society body to talk on behalf of the Nagas. It wants to be their only representative in the talks with GoI. Thus the outfit’s attitude and its impossible demands, such as that of ‘Greater Nagaland’, are the greatest hurdles for the peace process. There is no doubt that even if there is an agreement with the NSCN-IM, the peace will not return as other non-participating outfits have the capacity to prolong insurgency.

It is felt that of patience, mutual dialogue and understanding are the key factors to resolve such disputes and problems. Threats and actual use of force to reinforce one’s claims are not only destructive but are becoming increasingly counter-productive. Every protagonist, it is felt, must weigh his or her options and explore possibilities of dialogue and conciliation. To expect the Central govt. and the state govt’s alone to resolve it is becoming increasingly impractical. Besides, any effort to hurry the process by force of arms is no longer acceptable. With patience and mutual restraint with passage of time solutions can be found.

It needs mention that some recent positive developments in the region generate hope. Although the chauvinist voice, prompted by the fear of gun, continues to be heard in Assam, the Assamese auto-critiquing has blunted its edge. Moreover, the Assamese have very strong under-current of nationalist feeling. This was amply demonstrated during Kargil War, when ULFA was thrown to the margin after its appeal to support Pakistan. In Nagaland, Sema Hoho has raised its voice against NSCN-IM inspired violence and then asked the outfit to apologise. In a parallel development, Chakhesang Students Union, Chakhesang Baptist Church Council, Chakhesang Mothers Association and Chakhesang Youth Front jointly urged the Government of Nagaland to send ultras back to designated camps. The Naga urge for peace combined with the courage to counter violence is a happy development.

Ethnicity-related problems need multi-dimensional/multi-stage tackling, including tackling on intellectual and human rights fronts. While peace efforts should be allowed and facilitated with utmost sincerity, the Governments – Central and the State –should ensure that the terms of cease-fire agreements are strictly adhered to and none falls prey to insurgents’ bullets.

It is high time that the Central government (i) formulates proper policy regarding the ethnicity and insurgency related problems, (ii) learns to say ‘no’ to the impossible demands of the insurgents, e.g., the demands of inclusion of parts of Assam where not even two percent Nagas reside; (iii) ensures proper utilization of the funds flowing to the States; and (iv) initiating positive changes in the system of education with the help of the State governments, UGC and the Central Universities of the region.

The state governments should ensure (i) the stoppage of extortions, and pilferage of the public funds; (ii) gradual assumption of their duty of mobilization of local resources; sharing the financial burden more and more; (iii) gradual reduction in their dependence on army and paramilitary forces for the maintenance of law and order in the state.

It is essential to answer every myth and lie; counter every wrong signal - emanating even from the governments’ wrong actions; as discussed earlier - and every propaganda of the insurgents and the media supporting them. There is need of an all out frontal intellectual war with a view to eliminating confusion and haziness of ideas. The conscientious citizens, the civil society forums and the media should play a positive role.

The political parties and the civil society in the North-East should ensure that (i) the State governments properly deliver; (ii) blame game - blaming Delhi for every local failure, as for example, the failure of the State governments to pay salaries of their oversized workforce on the name of Centre’s ‘lack of concern’ – stops; (iii) local and intra-regional conflicts, as far as possible, are resolved peacefully and democratically with local/regional initiative, (iv) ethnic cleansing is stopped; (v) inter-tribal and inter-communal hatred is discouraged.

The combined strength of the police force of the states of the region large. They should play greater and effective role in controlling insurgency and violence so that need for and dependence on army and paramilitary forces is reduced to the minimum.

The Centre and the States should see that the problems related to ethnicity, insurgency and illegal migration should be speedily solved. Growth of infra-structure in the region needs to be prioritized.

Reference
    
1.   Hutton, The Angami Nagas, p. 4.
    
2.   Ibid, p.24.
    
3.   Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Martin Robertson Oxford, 1979, p. viii.
    
4.   Ghai, Autonomy and Ethnicity, p.4; quoted by Sushil K. Pillai, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) in ‘Ethnicity, autonomy and Governance, Faultline, Vol. 10, p. 31.
    
5.   Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal.
    
6.   Faultline, Vol. 14, p. 73.
    
7.   Charles Chasie, The Naga Imbroglio, p. 19.
    
8.