Dialogue  October-December, 2006 , Volume 8 No. 2

Recent Developments in Nepal and the impact on Indian internal security

Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

The Setting:

Events in Nepal have been moving at a bewildering pace and the nation is now poised to have a major seismic shift in its political order. The old dispensation based on 1990 Constitution, the country’s fifth, is almost dead and an interim constitution for the period leading to the constitutional assembly elections polls in June 2007 is soon to be promulgated.

The monarchy which played a major role in shaping the destiny of Nepal so far is being sidelined and its very existence has come into question. An active King, who ascended the throne by an accident, believed that destiny had brought him to save Nepal and monarchy and he underestimated the capability of the opposing political groups as well as India in influencing the events. His frontal attack on democracy in October 2002 and the final coup de grace in February 2004 brought the opposing forces together. A peoples’ movement - called Jana Andolan II successfully brought in a kind of Aorange revolution” that left the monarchy on its last legs. A few old hands like G.P.Koirala are making a desperate bid to retain monarchy at least in a ceremonial form. They may or may not succeed.

A tsunami in the form of Maoists and in the name of people’s power is sweeping across the country. It all began on 13 February 1998 when the first assault on the first truly democratic constitution of 1990 was made by the Maoists. In the initial stages, the existing government as well as those in India took little notice of it. What began as sporadic and unconnected killings of government officials and ruling party workers and attacks on isolated police posts soon developed into a regular insurgency in a matter of three years. The hilly terrain, backwardness of the people outside the main valleys, lack of communications, ethnic rivalries, neglect of the peripheries- all contributed to the success of the Maoists whose dominance expanded in the country side like a “wild prairie fire.” The absence of a stable government with the prime ministers occupying the seats like musical chairs and lack of rapport between the King who had the control of armed forces and the political parties who led a dysfunctional government contributed to the growth of the Maoists. What was more, for reasons best known to the late King Birendra, the Nepalese army was never permitted to go in support of the hapless Policemen who were battered and killed in remote posts. One famous case was that of the attack on Dunai on 25 September 2000 when the army detachment only 40 minutes away failed to come to the rescue of the Policemen and the district headquarters was occupied by the Maoists for over 18 hours. The army started regular counter insurgency operations only when their posts in Dang and Solokhumbu were attacked on 23rd and 26th November, 2001, but it was too late then.

The Maoists today are in a win - win situation. They have established themselves firmly in most of the rural areas and true to Prachanda path the current cease fire has helped them to mobilise the urban masses too. Soon in another month they are expected to join the interim parliament and interim government and it looks that slowly and steadily they are gaining strength and the possibility of a Maoist Nepal cannot be ruled out. All these developments should be cause for concern as India has a Maoist problem of its own and ideologically the Nepali Maoists are not any different from their Indian counterparts. The Maoists had time and again declared that India need not worry from a Maoist Nepal. This only time can say but the portents are not very encouraging. On this later.

The Palace Massacre brings forth an Assertive King:

Perhaps the defining moment on the recent developments should start from the Palace Massacre of June 1, 2001 when the entire royal household barring King Gyanendra, his wife and children were wiped out in an action similar to the >Kot massacre’. It was this situation that pushed up a more aggressive, more impulsive and a more intrusive King Gyanendra into power. The Maoists on the other hand used the Palace massacre to their advantage. Prachanda who had just elevated himself as Chairman of CPN(M) called it a conspiracy to remove liberal King Birendra from the scene. India also came in for a good measure of abuse from Prachanda. He said that A capitalists, hegemonistic rulers and other national and fundamental reactionaries did not tolerate the late King’s liberal thought.1

On the eve of King Gyanendra’s birthday in July 2001 the Maoists struck with a vengeance to show their strength. There were attacks on Police posts at three different places in Lamjung. Nuwakot and Gulmi. A nationwide strike was called on 12th July. Explosive devices were planted in Kathmandu itself and so were banners and slogans against the King, G.P.Koirala as also against India. By committing such incidents on the eve of the King’s birthday in Kathmandu, they virtually threw a challenge to the King.2 Looking back it now looks that the Maoists were planning to discredit the King who had a penchant for intrusive actions and to get him involved more and more into active day to day politics of the nation.

Sher Bahadur Deuba took over from G.P.Koirala as Prime Minister in the third week of July and he managed a truce with the Maoists. Three rounds of talks took place- in August 30th, September 14-15 and on third November 2001. It is interesting that at the top of the agenda of the Maoists were issues relating to India. Those relating to India were - abolition of unequal treaties including Indo Nepal 1950 Treaty, withdrawal of Indian troops from Kalapani, controlling the open Indo Nepal border and introduction of work permit system.3

Emergency Declared:

Following the simultaneous attacks on the army camps at Dang and Solokhumbu for the first time between November 21st and November 23rd, King Gyanendra on the recommendation of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba declared a state of emergency on 26th November 2001. Fundamental rights were curtailed and the CPN (Maoists) was declared a terrorist organisation.4 It was at the same time that the Maoists announced the setting up of a 37 member Joint Revolutionary People’s Council led by Baburam Bhattarai. Parallel structured administration with their own courts and law enforcement procedures were begun first in the western region and then extended rapidly.

Surprisingly there was hardly any response from India on the declaration of the emergency though India was bound by the provision of 1950 treaty to come to the aid of Nepal.5 Yet the Maoists saw a conspiracy and the involvement of India.6

The emergency did not bring in the desired results and in actual fact it made the government more unpopular. G.P.Koirala who headed the party quickly realised the situation and did not want to extend the emergency. The King on the other hand was keen to extend the emergency.

The emergency was due to expire on May 25, 2002. It was here that Prime minister Deuba committed the mistake of going against the prevailing view of his party and recommended extension of three months. Worse still, without the party’s mandate he recommended the dissolution of the national assembly and sought fresh elections. Thus, at the cost of a vertical split in the party, Prime Minister Deuba walked into the trap of King Gyanendra. The latter promptly acceded to the recommendation of the cabinet for a fresh spell of emergency, dissolved the house immediately and ordered fresh elections.7

It must have been clear to Deuba that the law and order situation did not permit any election in the near term. The Security forces had told the elections commission that the elections can be held in eight phases with an interval of twenty days each time plus 35 days fo actual polling and 45 days for counting- an exercise that would take over eight months. Deuba took the most realistic course of seeking postponement of the election by one year and to be allowed to head an “all party government.” Poor Deuba was led on to believe that the King having accepted the dissolution of the assembly earlier would agree to postponement under the general provisions of Article 127 of the Constitution8 for another one year.

The King takes over and Elections postponed indefinitely.

On October 4, 2002, instead of accepting Deuba’s recommendation, the King sacked Deuba and his government under Articles 127 and Article 27(3) of Constitution for his incompetence, assumed all executive powers Auntil alternate arrangements are made.” The election scheduled to be held on November 13 of that year was indefinitely postponed and an interim government with people having “clean image” was to be formed to establish peace and security and conduct the general elections.

This was another fatal mistake by the King. No doubt the recommendation made by Deuba for postponement of elections was constitutional, but he had no other option. Subsequent events would show how right Deuba was, as elections could not be held by successive Prime ministers nominated by the King and the law and order situation worsened. The King nominated a former Prime minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand again as Prime Minister. Though Chand had a clean record, he was a colourless personality whose only qualification was that he would do the King’s bidding which he did.

G.P. Koirala began the protest movement against the regressive action of the King.

The immediate reaction of G.P.Koirala was the formation of a “five party alliance” to oppose what he described as October 4 regression. He said that the King had breached the norms of a constitutional monarch and that there was a vital need to bring him back under the constitutional framework. No one welcomed the King’s move more than the Maoists. And it was a windfall for them.

Soon the Maoists showed their strength by calling for a nation wide strike for three days from 11th to 13th November. Life in Kathmandu came to a stand still and the Maoists to prove their capability set off explosions in different parts of the city including one near the RNAC building where the Indian Embassy’s library is located. The initiative for the movement against the King started to shift from the political parties to the Maoists. The dilemma the parties faced was that they were between the devil and the deep sea. There was a realisation that Nepal was going through a critical stage with the Maoists dominating and consolidating their hold in the country side. The country was steadily moving into a state of civil war. They were also aware that if they do nothing the monarchy will continue to assert itself to pre 1990 situation, thus dissipating all the gains the parties made. 9

King’s Attempt to Marginalise the Political Parties:

The year 2003 began on a positive note with the Maoists declaring a cease fire. For sometime earlier the King’s government was in touch with the Maoists and the cease fire declaration was in pursuance of its objective of isolating the political parties. What was surprising was that the King looked for a deal with the Maoists directly without involving the agitating six party alliance of the political parties opposing the take over10. Three rounds of talks took place between the Maoists and the Government. A 22 point code of conduct to be followed during the cease fire was also agreed upon.

The protest movement of the agitating parties continued, though it did not have the expected public support. The participants were mainly party cadres and their attempt to disturb the normal functioning of the government was not successful. The movement was not gaining momentum but soon the violence perpetrated on the impatient security forces gave them a fresh lease of life. Attempts by the political parties to re-convene the dissolved parliament drew international attention. Meantime, a new Prime minister Surya Bahadur Thapa was installed by the King after a show of discussions with the leaders of the agitating political parties.

That the Peace talks between the government and the Maoists were bound to fail was known as the Maoists did not give in on any of their demands. Surya Bahadur Thapa’s team made a valiant effort to produce a document which tried to address many of the concerns of the Maoists and it is one of the best documents produced during the conflict. It took into account the need for “protection of sovereignty vested in the people, constitutional monarchy, multi party democracy and national integrity and unity.”11

But the Maoists had no time for such nuances and rejected the offer outright. On 27th Prachanda called off the cease fire and declared that the rationale for cease fire, code of conduct and the talk process was over for the “time being.” Though the Maoist had no intention of giving in on any of their demands, the immediate provocation for withdrawal was the Doranga incident where seventeen unarmed Maoist Cadres were shot dead by the Security forces on August 17.

The breakdown in peace talks gave a fresh fillip to the agitating parties and the agitation entered the seventh phase on September 10 of the same year. A massive show of strength was made in a rally on 16th December and for the first time the parties declared their intention to involve the members of the public in the demonstrations.

The King in one of his last efforts tried to talk to the leaders. Surprisingly he talked to the leaders separately and not together. That was the first mistake. Secondly he did not discuss about the restoration of the Parliament. Instead he gave a seven point agenda for consideration which were 1. Consensus on national issues 2. Peace and Security 3. Curbing corruption 4. People oriented system of governance 5. National unity 6. People represented elections and 8. An all party consensus government.

Deuba installed as Prime Minsiter again by the King

Surya Bahadur Thapa had to finally give up his post of Prime Minister on 7th May 2004 as he failed to rope in the agitating political parties into the government and not before the agitation turned violent. The hapless King who should not have sacked Deuba in the first instance in October 2002 had to swallow his pride and recall Deuba as Prime minister again. Deuba was given the mandate to conduct the elections by April next year.

It was to the credit of Prime Minister Deuba that he managed to convince the King on one side and a few of the political parties on the other to join him to patch up a reasonable representative government with UML, RPP and NSA Mandal faction. But he did not take into account the Maoists who had by now reached the strategic offensive stage. The Maoist affiliated trade unions imposed an “indefinite blockade” on the capital from 18th August. It was said that not a single vehicle came through Thankot the entrance to the capital out of fear. The capital was running low on essential supplies and the Maoists withdrew the blockade after making a point how vulnerable the government was.

Deuba’s visit to India between September 8 and 12, 2004 was also a disappointment. All that Deuba got out of the Indian establishment was that India considered that the Maoist problem posed a security threat not only to Nepal but to the region as a whole.

The Maoists on the other hand held an important plenum meeting a little before in the last week of August and India came in for a considerable measure of abuse. The Plenum openly accused India of threatening Nepal with military intervention. In an online interview Prachanda for the first time talked of support from China. He said that India would avoid direct intervention in Nepal for the reason that China would neither support nor tolerate such intervention and retaliate with full force.12

The Maoists began a major offensive in the middle of December with a view to keep the political situation unsettled. The aim was also not to let Deuba consolidate his position. The most severe one was the attack on Argankanchi followed by blockades and bandhs all over the State. Deuba was unable to reach a consensus within his own coalition.

The King Takes Over

We now move to the last and final act in the Nepalese drama with the King finally deciding to take over governance directly in what could be termed as a royal coup on 1st February, 2005.13 He declared that he would give up power after three years by which time he hoped to settle the Maoist problem, conduct the elections and bring back democracy- a tall order indeed. In taking over, the King took a very big risk in trying to fight on two fronts- the Maoists on the one hand and the democratic parties on the other. Unwittingly he let the two groups join together, the consequences of which were not seen then. The King was also surprised by the strong international criticism his action invoked. The Indian reaction was also hard and uncompromising. Cancellation of SAARC Summit that followed was most unexpected. The Indian Foreign Minister called the move as a “severe set back.” But the King was unrepentant. He was heard to have remarded- “They said what they have to say and I did what I had to do.” The Maoists got the opportunity finally to form a “United front” with the agitating parties. Their immediate response was a call to the political parties to create a storm of country wide rebellion under a minimum programme of a people’s republic and a constituent assembly and the establishment of a “broad front” against the King.

Despite the repeated declarations to the contrary, the King continued to put the country back to the Panchayat days. On 11th April 2005 he introduced the post of Zonal Commissioners and appointed known hardliners of ex Panchayat regime to such posts. His attitude towards India was rather disappointing. He had promised the
Indian Prime Minister in the Jakarta meeting that he would be taking steps for reconciliation with the political parties in return for the resumption of arms aid to his security forces but did the opposite. Even before reaching home both the ex Prime Minister Deuba and minister Prakash Man Singh were dragged from their houses in the middle of the night to jail.

The Seven Party Alliance and the ‘End Game’

With the King’s actions giving no room for reconciliation, the agitating parties made a historical decision of forming a seven Party Alliance (SPA) on May 5, 2005 which in course of time proved to be the major challenge to the monarchy. The seven party alliance consisted of different groups. Besides the two factions of Nepali Congress, others were the CPN (UML), NSP Anandi faction, People’s Front Nepal, Nepal Workers and Peasants Party and the United Left front . For the first time all the parties were unanimous in the idea of a revival of the dissolved parliament. The Maoists understood the importance of the united front put up by the seven parties and promptly offered their party’s support in the protest movement of the political groups. Sadly the King on the other hand did not understand the seriousness of the united front and went on with some of the harsher provision of the emergency ( emergency was lifted by then).

It was more or less at the same time the Maoists made contact with the senior leaders of CPI (M) in India. It was not clear at whose initiative the meeting took place. But Prachanda admitted of such a meeting taking place and said that the “objective of the meeting was to gauge India’s stand if the Maoists were to accept a multi party system as a political solution and its willingness to work with other parties.14 What is significant here is that this meeting took place in the full knowledge of the Indian authorities who were aware of the consequences. Perhaps at that point of time having realised that its policy of supporting the twin pillars of “constitutional monarchy and multi party democracy” taking them nowhere, the Indian government made a course change in its policy towards Nepal. 15

The seven party alliance and the Maoists Decide to work jointly.

The central Committee of the Maoists in its communique on June 19, 2005 declared that the party with the cooperation of the seven political parties was prepared to make the movement forceful and united in order to bring the absolute monarchy to an end. It could have been only for tactical reasons.

In due course Indian involvement became more open and this was clear during the visit of G.P.Koirala to Delhi ostensibly for medical treatment but more for discussing with the Maoist leaders on the mechanics for the restoration of democracy with the full knowledge and advice from the Indian authorities. In this he was considerably helped by King’s top functionary and first Vice Chairman in the government Dr. Giri who declared that monarchy and democracy cannot go hand in hand and one of them has to surrender. 16 The Maoists on the other hand were all sweet reasonableness. On 28 July 2005, Prachanda gave a formal response on the talks and said that their objectives are limited to an end to dictatorial monarchy, election to a constituent assembly in a republican set up and bringing the army under electoral representatives.17 At the same time they continued to keep up the pressure on the security forces. In a major attack on a security camp at Pala village in Kalikot District on 7th August, 2005, the security forces lost 40 killed and 52 were taken as prisoners.

Twelve Point Agreement Reached.

Towards the third week of November discussions between the SPA ( seven party alliance) leaders and the Maoists reached the final stage and it was said that the top Maoist leaders were in Delhi on the 17th and 18th of November. A twelve-point agreement between the seven party alliance and the Maoists was announced on 22nd November which in retrospect was perhaps the end game in the conflict that was started by the Maoists in February 1996.18 The major points in the agreement were 1. Peace and prosperity will be impossible without ending monarchy and absolute monarchy. 2. The political parties would go for a road map by reinstatement of parliament first followed by an all party government, talks with Maoists and election to the constituent assembly. The Maoists differed with the political parties only on having an interim government after a national conference of political parties and then on to constituent assembly elections. 3. There was a commitment from the Maoists to multi party system, fundamental rights of the people, human rights, rule of law, democratic principles and values. 4. Perhaps the most important point of agreement was the decision to mutually support a people’s movement.

The End Game

The confrontation between the King and the agitating political parties reached a decisive and critical stage when a statewide agitation was planned from April 6. The Maoists had given the party moral support though in actual fact they were instrumental in mobilising the masses for the final show down.

The government lost a good opportunity is not allowing the massive rally proposed in Kathmandu on the 8th of April. Instead curfew was imposed from the morning of 8th till 10th. The movement which started with small rallies and processions gathered momentum as the days went by and the police on instructions from the frustrated officials in the government started using excessive force in putting down unlawful assemblies. Soon the political leaders of the seven parties joined the processions to court arrests. As expected the Maoists in their central committee meeting on 9th April decided to support the movement in a big way and threw a direct challenge to the King. The decisions included removing all royal statues, all sign boards carrying the name of “His Majesty,” to encourage the local bodies to declare republican zones and to retain the Rajmarg under the control of their PLA.

Indiscriminate and excessive force against peaceful demonstrators brought only more people to the streets and people of all walks of life including lawyers, professors and journalists joined the movement. Demonstrations which were initially restricted to the towns spread like wild fire all over Nepal. While the main demand continued to be the restoration of the Parliament, the King after prodding by an emissary sent from Delhi made a half-hearted gesture of calling upon the seven party alliance to recommend a name for the post of Prime Minister and to govern the country according to 1990 Constitution.

The King Caves in

By then the mood of the people had changed to one of rage. They were not for any reconciliation with the King ( which the Government of India misjudged) and the offer was rejected outright. Too late in the day afer over 17 known deaths, 7 disappearances, 24 physically disabled including 8 who lost their vision and hundreds of people injured, the King finally caved in on 24th night and issued a proclamation reinstating the parliament dissolved on 22nd May 2002. He directed the parliament to be convened on 28th April.

If there was one group that benefitted most it was the Maoist. It was also the end of the triangular balance that had been in place with the King, the political parties and the Maoists as three legs of a tripod. It was also a personal triumph for Prachanda and his Prachanda path where mass mobilisation had worked. The success of the agitation was not a little due to the ground support given by the Maoists at every stage.

G.P. Koirala appointed as Prime Minister:

One of the first acts of Prime Minister Koirala was to bring the Army under the control of the Government. The label “Royal” was removed. A committee was quickly set up to draft a new constitution and a commission to enquire into the excesses committed by the officials and the security forces during the Jana Andolan. The United Nations was later approached jointly by the Government and the Maoists to oversee the arms management and the conduct of the elections. The Maoists continued to extend the cease fire and a 25 point code of conduct was also agreed to for duration of the cease fire.

It took almost seven months and repeated negotiations by the seven party alliance and the Maoists to come to a comprehensive agreement on all issues relating to arms management, interim arrangements and the conduct of elections to the constitutional assembly. This historic agreement decided upon on 8th November, 2006 included the following. 
           l   The arms of the Maoists and an equal number of the Nepalese army will be stored with the key 
                remaining with the combatants and the UN providing the monitoring system. The Maoist cadres are 
                to be located in seven camps.
           l   An interim legislature will be formed with near about equal representation of Maoists, Nepali 
                Congress of G.P. Koirala and the UML. Elections to the Constitutional assembly will be held in the 
                second week of June 2007 and the United Nations will be monitoring the elections. The King will 
                have no role in the country’s affairs till then and the first session of the CA will decide on the 
                question of monarchy.
           l   The Constituent Assembly will have 425 members that will be elected in part by first past the post 
                and the rest on the basis of proportional representation.
           l   Citizenship Issue will be resolved before CA elections and the cut off date will be of 1990.

Impact on Indian Security

In assessing the impact of the developments in Nepal on Indian security, we will have to take into consideration the following points.

          1.   The Maoists have by now entrenched themselves fully in Nepal. Even if we grant that the Maoists may not get a majority in the CA elections or in the subsequent dispensations to be put in place by the Constituent Assembly, the Maoists will still have a dominant role. What started as a small localised communist pockets in western Nepal in February 1996 has spread all over Nepal now. Now they have the guns and the militia. They are not only in the country side but have since mobilised in the towns and more importantly in Kathmandu itself. They cannot be wished away.

          2.   It is estimated that Maoists have over 20,000 modern arms and a strength of 35,000 cadres, not a small number for a country like Nepal. In the comprehensive agreement reached with the SPA the Maoists have agreed to lock up their arms but have retained the keys, with the UN only having monitoring devices on the locks. One cannot therefore say that they Maoists have given up their arms and despite their repeated statements that they will not go back to the jungles to pursue the people’s war, their access to the arms and possible use cannot be ruled out if the future dispensation does not further their cause for a proletarian revolution.

          3.   The Maoists in Nepal cannot deny their connections with the Maoist parties in India. After all, the people’s war in Nepal started only after a meeting between the Indian Communist Party (Marxist Leninist People’s war) and the Nepal Communist Party on 1st July 1995. Following this meeting, decision to go on a people’s war was taken in the first national conference and then it was called “Plan for the historical initiative for a People’s War.” The forty point demand made on 5th February 1996 and going on the offensive three days short of the deadline showed that the Maoists were ready for a people’s war. The organic connection between the Maoists on either side continued.19.

          4.   The Communist Party of Nepal CPN (M) took the initiative in forming what is known as CCOMPOSA on July 21, 2001. One of the objectives of CCOMPOSA was to Acoordinate the activities of Maoist parties and organisations in South Asia by spreading protracted people’s war in the region in the context of hastening the world proletarian socialist revolution.” In the very first declaration India was identified as a common enemy. It said we quote “ The Indian Expansionist State backed by World Imperialism . . . constitutes the enemy of the people . . . This provides a concrete political basis for the building the unity of the South Asian revolutionary forces.”

                It is of significance that the third meeting of CCOMPOSA took place somewhere in Jharkhand from 16th March to 18th March 2004. The Indian participants included MCCI of India, RCCI (MLM) of India. Two important points in the conference were the reference to the merger of MCC and PWG of India Aadvancing towards greater unification” and the welcome given to the newly formed Bhutan Maoist Communist Party. India was as before roundly criticised.20

                This anti Indian tirade continued as recently as September, 2006 when the fourth conference of CCOMPOSA continued with anti Indian resolutions.21 The resolutions of the fourth conference gave the impression that the Maoists in Nepal contrary to what they claimed as having renounced people’s war and go for competitive democracy would continue to deepen and extend their links with the Maoists of the region and work for seizure by armed force. The Maoists of Nepal were represented by a central Committee member. Of the members who attended there were Maoists from Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

          5.   The international connections of Maoists in Nepal are well known. It is a part of the Revolutionary International Movement. The International Communist Movement web site in China22 took note of the birth of the CPI-Maoist in October 2004 with a detailed report (September 14,2005) on the subject, accompanied by the full text of that Party’s report in English, containing information on the CPI ML-MCC merger process, the nature of the epoch( threat from imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism; Indian expansionism’s great security threat in South Asia; People’s War advancing in Andhra, Jharkhand, Bihar, Dandakaranya and the adjoining parts); coordination with other World Maoist Parties like those in Peru, the Philippines and Turkey; Five Political Documents adopted; Party Programme (New Democratic revolution through protracted People’s war); Strategy and Tactics (Establishing base areas, forming a United People’s Guerilla army) and the new Party Constitution.

          6.   Media reports have been giving a spin that the Chinese are embarrassed by the activities of the Maoists of Nepal but are unwilling to come against them for fear of offending the good name of Mao. One report even suggested that the Chinese are willing to support the Nepalese government in their fight against the Maoists. But the infernal Chinese language web sites give a contrary signal. In a country where the web sites are controlled and even giants like Yahoo and Google had to submit to them, one cannot wish away the material that have been posted in the Chinese web sites on the situation in Nepal and the activities of the Maoists of Nepal. One Chinese website was quite emphatic in its support for the CPN-Maoist. It highlighted (June 5, 2004) the publication of a book captioned “Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal,” a collection of articles by Prachanda and other CPN-Maoist leaders. A write-up in the site (June 6, 2004) on “Introduction to the CPN-Maoist policies,” was in the nature of informing the Chinese population about the growth of that Party in Nepal. Significant observations were made in the site (March 27, 2005) by a scholar of the Department of International Relations, Beijing University. Quoting analysts, he projected the view that contrary to common perceptions, the CPN-Maoist does not fall in the category of a world terrorist movement which needs to be fought and that instead, the Maoists in Nepal are a product of the country’s poverty.

          7.   For the last three years the Maoists of Nepal have been turning their attention to Bhutan. The frustrated youths in the refugee camps in eastern Nepal were ideal material for recruitment and have since encouraged the formation of Communist Party of Bhutan ( Maoist). Since the last cease fire open lectures and training are being given to some of the youths in the camps. It is assessed that over 500 members of the refugee camps have joined the party. They have called the new democratic reforms and the constitution envisaged in Bhutan as a sham and a possibility of their taking up arms at a later stage against the monarchy cannot be ruled out. This is of immediate relevance to India as no country is closer to India than Bhutan and any instability in Bhutan would be of great concern to India.

          8.   Roughly one could say that Maoist’s anti India tirade continued in full swing upto the 12 point agreement between them and the seven party alliance that was facilitated by India. Then the rhetoric against India toned down but became shriller when it was mistakenly thought by them that India was standing in the way of giving up monarchy. It is interesting to see what Prachanda said to the BBC on 1st September 2006 before the comprehensive agreement was accepted by the Maoists on 9th November, 2006. This interview is being analysed in detail not because it is anti Indian but because it raises certain questions which have immediate consequences for India as also his attitude towards China.23 The points he made were
                l  He does not believe that India favours the abolition of monarchy.
                l  India presently follows the Nehru doctrine that seeks to intimidate, interfere, expand its influence 
                    and dictate its terms on its neighbours. In the same breath he made a strange statement that the 
                    Chinese were backing the King traditionally as a factor of stability!.
                l  On Kashmir. He believed that the Kashmiri people should get their right of self determination – 
                    the right to decide their fate and this applied to the people of northeast India. He clarified that self 
                    determination does not mean separation. But on Tibet while he said that Tibetan people should 
                    also get the right of self determination he added that the autonomy given by the Chinese to the 
                    Tibetans is in accordance with the aspirations of the Tibetan people.
                l  On the Beijing-Lhasa rail link up, Nepal had leaned far towards the southern neighbour due to the 
                    economy, open borders, transport and communications that put them to disadvantage and that 
                    the train service would help restore some balance.

          9.   However since October 2006, realising the imminence of getting into the interim government and interim council and the need to be on good terms with India has made a course correction that started from Bhattarai’s statement in the first week of October 200624 to the “charm offensive’ of Prachanda and Bhattarai in Delhi which they did with considerable elan on 17th to 19th November 2006. In this they got considerable help from the CPI M in Delhi, some think tanks and the media. In the talk programme Bhattarai said and I quote “ India has a fear that we will export and influence its insurgency and arms in Indian territories once we are in power which is not true because we do not want to sever our bilateral relations in India by ignoring its internal security concerns. Bhattarai understood the Indian concerns.

        10.   Prachanda was more explicit during his visit to India to attend the Leaders’ summit. He said in the ORF meeting on 18th November, that a new Nepal cannot come into being without close links with India. He made a surprising statement that the people of Nepal were losing their >psychological fear of India’ though in actual fact the common people other than the elite in the country side do not think India to be a threat. He also denied the concept of a red corridor from “Tirupati to Pasupati.”

The points we had mentioned should be borne in mind in assessing the impact of developments in Nepal on the internal security of India. Nepal’s long and open border with India is well known. The special relations that India enjoyed may be open to question once the Maoists take a leading role in the governance in Nepal. These would mostly impinge on the foreign policy and the very concept of special relations India has had with some of the neighbouring countries. The first few points made by the Maoists in the forty point demand in early 1996 are relevant to India and will continue to be irksome to the Indian policy planners.

During the conflict many of the Maoist leaders operated from India and it may be recalled that the leftist parties met Prachanda at Siliguri twice. They have established an extensive network both in West Bengal and Bihar. Two of the top leaders of the Maoists are under trial in West Bengal on charges of subversion.

India’s intervention in facilitating the 12 point demand is a major shift in Indian policy and now India will be facing a different Nepal. Doomsayers who said that Nepal’s continued survival would depend on either survival of monarchy or its transformation into an “Indian Vassal State” should have been disappointed by the turn of events. Their prediction of a strong anti-government mood developing in India in the Nepali speaking areas in the north and northeast and perhaps within the Gorkha regiments has also not been proved.25

Conclusion:

India in due course is likely to be faced with a Maoist or Maoist dominated Nepal. There are many analysts in India who fear that the political parties in Nepal are not strong enough to stop the dominance of the Maoists in the political landscape of Nepal. The following questions arise-

          1.   Till recently the Indian Maoist Parties looked upon the Maoists Party of Nepal as a model and a shining example of the success of the People’s war. Despite differences on the merits of the Maoists going for competitive democracy, will the Indian parties cut themselves away totally from them? What happens to the CCOMPOSA of which the CPN (M) is a founding member.

          2.   Once the Maoists are settled in Nepal how long can they resist in providing the Indian Maoists shelter and safety? After all the Indian Maoists had provided the Nepalese shelter earlier during the conflict in Nepal. Isn’t India having enough problems in the north and east with the Indian terrorists finding shelter and support from Pakistan and Bangladesh?

          3.   It is too early to make a judgement whether the Maoists in Nepal have decided to give up the arms and join mainstream politics in Nepal. What happens if the Maoists do not get a dominant position in the Constitutional Assembly elections soon to be held? With access to the arms, what guarantee is there that they may not take to arms?

          4.   What guarantee is there that the Maoists may not turn their attention to Bhutan which may have the only surviving monarchy in this region? Can India afford to have an unstable Bhutan on its border?

There are no short answers to these questions and perhaps it is too early to assess the impact on India’s security with the rise of Maoists in Nepal. Only time can say whether India was justified in facilitating an agreement between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance that paved the way in marginalising the monarchy.

References:

     1.   The term “Hegemon” is a favourite abuse of Chinese and used often against India. Prachanda only followed the Chinese example.

     2.   See Note number 128 of South Asia Analysis Group- “The Maoists strike with a vengeance.

     3.   These demands were already in the forty demands made by Baburam Bhattarai on Prime minister Deuba with a deadline of February 16 2001 given but the Maoists did not wait and attacked the posts in the mid western region on February 13th itself.

     4.   Interestingly, India declared the Nepalese Maoists as a “terrorist organisation”much earlier and this label continued till this day of writing. Yet the Indian authorities made no secret of their contacts with the Maoist leaders, of their meeting with others in India soil and to cap it all to let Prachanda come to Delhi and attend a summit meeting attended by world leaders arranged by the New Delhi Newspaper- Hindusthan Times. Thus the cycle was complete with the Maoists of Nepal being legitimised and lionised while their counterparts in India continued with their depredations in many of the states in India.

     5.   It was the time that India with its vast experience in counter insurgency operations could have helped. Short of getting involved on the ground, India should have gone all out to help Nepal tackle the Maoists. For reasons best known to the then National Security Adviser, there was one of total “benign neglect”.

     6.   See Jana Desh of October 9 of 2001

     7.   Koirala whose relationship with the King had never been good in the best of times suspected the hands of the King in the dissolution and called it a “grand conspiracy”. In our view this action of the King proved fatal as the Deuba government could not have taken on his own his party and the Maoists and conduct the elections within the stipulated period of six months.

     8.   Article 127 of the Constitution reads as follows: “ If any difficulty arises in connection with the implementation of the Constitution, His Majesty may issue necessary orders to remove such difficulty and such orders shall be laid before the Parliament.” There is no doubt that this is an omnibus provision meant to deal with any constitutional crisis.

     9.   See a discussion on these aspects in Note 168 of South Asia Analysis Group- www.saag.org dated 10th December, 2002.

   10.   Since the Panchayat days the monarchy had always looked upon the political parties with democratic credentials as its main enemy. One of the ways the monarchy tried to reduce their influence was to encourage the communist parties and the folly of their action and the results could be seen decades later. After some time there came into existence a group of communists who were known as “Royal Communists”

   11.   The full text of the document can be seen in Mr. Upreti’s book on the present conflict.The price of Neglect, Bishnu Raj Upreti, Bhrikuti Academic publications,Annexure 3 b page 379.

   12.   The full text of the Press Statement on the plenum can be seen in Note 242 of www.saag.org of South Asia Analysis Group dated 29th September, 2004,

   13.   This action of the King was similar to what his late father did on the evening of December 15, 1960 when a lawfully elected government of Nepali Congress of B.P. Koirala was similarly dismissed and all the cabinet ministers present at the Youth Congress function were arrested.

   14.   See SAAG note “ The King and the Political Parties- little hope and much despair” Note no 263 in www.saag.org.

   15.   The initiative perhaps came from the Maoist side after their central plenum decided to go for competetive democracy as substage for their overall objective of dictatorship of proletariat. As we would see this has paid them rich dividends.

   16.   SAAG note in www.saag.org note no. 269 dated 20th July 2005.

   17.   Prachanda in an interview to a local daily on August 24, 2005 said that collaboration with the seven party alliance was to break the existing trilateral power balance.

   18.   A full text of the agreement can be seen in ekantipur.com of November 22 in www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid’57858

   19.   The Outlook issue on Indian naxalites mentioned about the “doctor Amma” of the Naxalites spending some time in Nepal in arranging training sessions to the Nepali cadres in first aid and medical treatment.

   20.   The full text of the CCOMPOSA conference is carried in SAAG web site in www.saag.org/notes3/note221.html

   21.   See SAAG note no 336 in www.saag.org/notes4/note336.html on the fourth conference,

   22.   Please see D.S. Rajan’s paper 1565 in www.saag.org .B Are the Chinese keeping their options open to deal with a CPN- Maoist which may in future capture power in Nepal? This was the question posed in that paper after discussing the internal discussions in China on the people’s war in Nepal.

   23.   See the full discussion of the interview in note 339 of www.saag.org

   24.   See the details of the interview of Dr. Baburam Bhattarai in note 337-    www.saag.org/notes4/note337.html
   25.              See the paper on Nepal’s Conflict and National Security- by M.R.Josse - page 55, in Cost of Armed Conflict in India.