Dialogue July - September, 2001 , Volume 3 No. 1
The Agra
summit : A Balance Sheet
J.N. Roy
Now that dust on the Agra summit (Feb 15-16) between India and Pakistan has settled down with both the protagonists promising to carry on the process of dialogue and all the experts and analysts having had their say and predictions, its time to take a stock-taking of the outcome in realistic terms. An Indo-Pak summit or dialogue is not an easy one to handle or assess. Lot of history, emotions, domestic and external compulsions, and mutual perceptions of each others difficulties (often exaggerated) influence the process at every stage. With the new heightened media hoopla - both visual and print - and a bevy of experts opining on each development, the truth and rationality are difficult to comprehend in the short run.
As it is Indo-Pak relations are very complex and difficult and these externalities only add to and at times complicate the process. Not only the bitter relations of last fifty years, interspersed with three and half (Kargil) wars, but the history of the sub-continent of the last thousand years also rides it. These have spawned a climate of distrust and underlying hostility, presaging a prolonged adversarial relationship. Acquisition of nuclear status (May 1998) by both the countries has added urgency to the need for containing and, then resolving their differences. But its easier said than done.
There was and still is, a feeling at the end of the Agra Summit that it was a failure and the Pak President, with the help of media, hijacked it. We may perhaps, defer conclusions for some time. A much touted summit ending without any visible result is bound to invite criticism on various counts by the well meaning; busy-bodies and by the political opponents. India, however, has not fared at the end as badly as is being made out. It exhibited a sense of realism, decorum and optimism in dealing with a difficult neighbour, who tended to be more intransigent and aggressive in the false belief that India could perhaps be coerced into accommodating Pak concerns, without any recompense, as happened at Tashkent and Shimla. That the denouement at Agra was unexpected for both the sides, underscored the shared anxiety not to describe it as a failure but a first step in a continuing process. The decision of the Prime Minister to continue the dialogue and visit Pakistan despite diplomatic improprieties of the guest; is a statement of maturity and diplomatic skill and not weakness. The nuclear imperative requires that both countries address their difference seriously and with a sense of realism.
In order to get a proper perspective it is necessary to understand the prevalent mindset in both the countries, and the situation on the eve of the invitation (May 23, 2001) by Prime Minister Vajpayee to Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then the Chief Executive of Pakistan to visit India for a dialogue. The timing of the invitation became a matter of speculation in view of Indias stand ever since the Kargil aggression ( July 99) of Pakistan, that unless Pakistan stops its trans-border help to terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir ( J&K), there cannot be any dialogue. This Indian response followed a number of public statements by Gen. Musharraf that he was willing to talk to India any where and any time.
Indian response of no talks at that time was a result of:
(a) anger over Kargil, immediately after the Lahore Declaration (1999)
(b) reluctance to provide legitimacy to a military regime, which had replaced a democratically elected, Govt. in a coup (Oct. 99),
(c) to pressurize Pakistan to contain its help to ongoing militancy in J&K, which it described as indigenous,
(d) to await the result of its cease-fire and dialogue initiatives in J&K. in response to peoples desire for peace and normalcy which had intensified since Kargil, and
(e) uncertainty prevailing in Pakistan as to who was in control;
when will democracy be restored and if the present military rulers have come to stay and will be in a position to honour their commitments.
By the beginning of the year 2001 answers to most of these reservations were getting clarified. The army regime had come to stay and surprisingly, there was no perceptible enthusiasm among people for return to democracy. Gen. Pervez Musharraf had consolidated his hold and was preparing to anoint himself as President, so that be could run a controlled democracy in compliance with the Supreme Court orders. Pakistan, while declining to scale down its support to militancy, under the usual stand that it was only extending political and diplomatic support to what is purely indigenous "freedom struggle" it, however, did make a gesture of bringing down cross-border exchange of firings on the LOC in J&K in response to Indian initiatives in Kashmir.
In the light of earlier stiff stand of India on a dialogue, the invitation surprised many. Even some very well informed analysts interpreted it due to the failure of the Vajpayee initiative in J&K; some saw it as under pressure from the US and others. Truth lay some where else. Strategically, India, cannot and should not shun dialogue with a difficult neighbour, now that it had acquired nuclear status. There are reasons to believe that the main impetus came from Track-II operators, some of whom are said to be USA based. They seem to have convinced some responsible people in Prime Ministers office that Pakistans attitude has changed, and that the military Govt. was willing to do business based on realism. Instances like Pakistan Govt.s efforts to reign in sectarian violence, recover arms, efforts at scaling down blasphemy laws and the Pakistan compulsion to change its international image in respect of terrorism and overthrow of a democratic regime, were considered indicators of this change. What ever it may have been, the decision to resume dialogue (always desirable) with its most difficult adversary was a major one, and must have followed some assurances from some quarters, as at that stage the Western countries were still not accommodative on the issue of restoration of democracy.
Another aspect in any Indo-Pakistan relationship is negative perceptions about each other. The prevalent negative perceptions in India about Pakistans problems and difficulties were either exaggerated or not well founded. There is a belief that Pakistan is a failed state and now a terrorist state and that the West and US are likely to dump it. Same can be said about Pakistan being in acute economic distress. It had come out of the economic slump and the IMF and World Bank loans and salvage measures were already in the pipeline before the invitation. Western nations will not allow Pakistan to sink and join the ranks of rogue nations, with its nuclear weapon becoming Islamic bomb. There are still a number of Pak sympathizers in the Pentagon and Department of State in USA. Strategic importance of Pakistan has shrunk and any notion that its going to he abandoned is not correct. US - Pak relations are just under adjustment. Its leverage with Taliban, access to Central Asia and its China connection will always keep Pakistan in focus.
Similarly, on the eve of dialogue, a number of false notions prevailed in Pakistan about India. Some of which are long held and some had relevance to the current situation in India. Long held ones are:
(a) the bitterness of partition was further intensified by the Kashmir issue, where Pakistan feels that it had been unjustly deprived of a Muslim majority state by the Indian perfidy. Three wars over the issue have only deepened the chasm,
(b) added to these, the dismemberment of Pakistan (1971) with creation of Bangladesh is directly blamed on India, and added sentiments of revenge to Pak mindset vis--vis India. More than two generations of Pakistanis have been weaned on a diet of hatred towards India, which according to propaganda is not reconciled to the existence of Pakistan,
(c) alleged hegemonistic ambitions of India in the region and fears of domination of Pakistan compelled it to match India in Defence preparedness, including nuclear weapons and through alliances (CENTO and China ), and
(d) There is also a strategic thinking in Pakistan of a long standing that the Indian State is full of contradictions and will collapse under the weight of these religious, racial and regional differences. Pakistan need only give this process an impetus and push. Pakistani help to secessionists in Punjab, in the North-East and promoting communal and Muslim militancy in India currently have to be seen in this background.
The current perceptions in Pakistan both among the official and influential circles on the eve of the summit can be summed as:
(a) that India has been exhausted and bled in Kashmir and Siachin, and is waging a losing battle in Kashmir. Therefore, political and militant pressure on India needs to be kept up,
(b) that Pakistan and pro-Pak militants have an upper hand in Kashmir and India is bound to propose dialogue and accommodate Pakistani view point,
(c) the offer of dialogue was result of the US pressure to reach an agreement,
(d) assurance of Nuclear deterrence negates any Indian adventurism in respect of a and b above.
The invitation of Prime Minister Vajpayee came as a great relief to Pakistani establishment. It was promptly accepted. It implied two things. India was willing to do business with a military dictator and that in Indias estimation this regime had come to stay. However, the earlier suspicions in respect of Indian initiatives in Kashmir as means to sidetrack or down grade the Pak role in the problem, were further strengthened. Pakistan had then, in the face of public pressure been able to pursuade APHC to boycott the talks unless Pakistan was included as third party. The Indian offer of summit was viewed as a means to side track APHC and pro-Pak militant thrust in J&K by resorting to bilateralism with Pakistan. Initially the APHC felt that the prompt acceptance of the invitation was a let-down by Pakistan, particularly when it had stood by it althrough. Another, challenge at home was to legitimize the right of the military regime to negotiate with India. This was achieved by holding widespread consultations, and assuring the fundamentalist and Jehadi circles, that the cause of self-determination in J&K will not be abandoned.
Initial reaction of these groups and the Pak-Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) had been adverse on the ground that India could not be trusted and that the Kashmir problem can only be solved by Jehad and not by dialogue. JEI-Pak said (Hindu, June 19) that Gen. Musharraf had no mandate to visit India but later altered its stand after meeting the General. For Gen. Musharraf to consolidate his home constituency in Pakistan and achieve a level of consensus behind his visit was necessary. Boycott by two major parties viz. PPP and PML (Nawaz Sharif) questioning his legitimacy, were the initial hiccups of not much consequence. Musharraf tried to address Indian concerns by asking the religious groups (June 6) at a Surat Conference not to give boastful statements against India.
Initially, Pakistan tactically or otherwise, had adopted rather moderate postures. In an interview to India Today (June 4, 2001) Abdul Sattar stated that "we will be open and flexible" during the dialogue. Thereafter, the stance gradually hardened and developed an approach of highlighting the centrality of Kashmir in any dialogue. Discussions on all other subjects, including the nuclear issue, were made contingent upon satisfactory progress on Kashmir issue. This viewpoint was propagated with consistency to which, later, consultation with and participation of Kashmiris was made a necessary step. This helped Gen. Musharraf in:
(a) getting consensus behind him of even the religious and Jehadi groups,
(b) downgrading the importance of earlier Shimla Pact and Lahore Declaration as these had allegedly failed to deliver the results and had not accorded central importance to the Kashmir issue and dispute.
That Gen. Musharraf assumed the Presidency of Pakistan soon after the Indian invitation was not due to it but the process was hastened to provide him a constitutional status. Pakistans approach and stance towards the dialogue progressively hardened as the date of summit approached, and this was to an extent helped by Indias reluctance to controvert it, hoping that all this was a public posturing to reassure the hard-liners at home. Meanwhile, Pakistan authorities including Gen. Musharraf met large number of journalists and media personalities from India who visited Pakistan before the summit. Their interactions tended to be constructive and rhetoric regarding Kashmir and complaints of excesses of security forces in Kashmir were taken as usual Pakistani propaganda on Kashmir.
However, by the end of June Pakistan started even justifying the invitation to the APHC leaders to their High Commissioners reception to Gen. Musharraf on July 14, despite the reservations of the host country. Gen. Musharraf himself started using strong terms like talks on anything other than Kashmir being "useless" unless this issue is resolved. Pakistans refusal to have an agenda for the summit, giving no credence to the confidence building measures (CBMs) announced by India; a feeling that APHC leaders will also have a private audience with the Pak President and persistence in making Kashmir the only issue for discussions, and that there were three parties to the dispute India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir, amounted to dictating the agenda. Musharraf, himself made it clear in a interview to GULF NEWS (Hindu - July 14) that the "people of Pakistan would not allow any reconciliation until the main conflict (Kashmir) was resolved". In the same statement Gen. Musharraf described the two compacts at Shimla and Lahore as failures as these ignored the centrality of the Kashmir dispute. The Indian silence and failure to get a structure for a dialogue in place, which is normal, must have been the result of some assurance or hope from some quarter. There was some unease and the statement of the Indian External Affairs Minister protesting against the unilateral trashing of the Shimla and Lahore documents and reiterating the composite nature of the dialogue, was a little late and mild reaction. For whatever reasons, Pakistan felt that it could dictate the agenda in the name of reality in almost a take it or leave it mode. Never before an Indo-Pak dialogue had been approached in this manner. In India some confusion prevailed and silence was considered the best option. Boycott of the High Commissioners reception by the NDA was considered an appropriate response and the invitation to APHC was considered a "non-issue" by senior NDA leader George Fernandes, and that India should not be "fussy" (Hindu - July 12) according to Manmohan Singh (Cong I), the leader of opposition in Rajya Sabha. I.K. Gujral, the former Prime Minister and a proponent of the Track II diplomacy, read the signal correctly and refused to attend the reception in protest. Pakistans explanations of past precedents in this regard and persistence concealed, by now a well coordinated approach. The confusion and reluctance to take on Pakistan does not seem to be due to reason of courtesy and decorum as claimed by the Prime Minister (August 7) but patently due to confusion and lack of coordination and centralised command.
On July 14, Gen. Musharraf landed in Delhi and went through all the correct motions. He was the first Pak head to visit Gandhijis Samadhi, visited his place of birth (Haveli), met the Delhi intellectuals and his media spinners charmed the visual media. To any objective observer, he had buried the summit by 5 PM that day, when he gave about 25 minutes of private audience to the APHC delegation before the reception and pledging continued "diplomatic and political" support to the ongoing struggle in Kashmir. What this pledge of support has meant in the last twelve years in Kashmir everyone knows. Musharrafs message was clear. He will not let down his constituency in Kashmir irrespective of feelings of India that also on its own soil. He made clear that Pakistan considers Kashmiris to be the integral component of any dialogue or solution of the problem and that as far as Pakistan was concerned the APHC represents the people of Kashmir. India was left with no option but to gulp it and put up a brave face. What is astonishing is that none of the experts except, two (Chellaney and Parthasarthy) correctly understood the message. Never before had the sensibilities of the host nation been treated like this. It amounted to Indian Prime Minister on a visit to Pakistan receiving the MQM delegation at Karachi and publicly supporting its cause and allegations of discrimination and atrocities, except that, Pakistan will say that Kashmir is a "disputed" territory and Sindh is an internal affair. But import of the message will be the same. Yet there was no response either direct or indirect.
What happened at Agra on June 15 and 16, during the several (some say five) one to one meetings between the two leaders and delegation meetings, understandably, has two versions - Indias and Pakistans. But lack of feed back of any kind, even the vaguely optimistic ones from the Indian side, was the first signal of a troubled summit. Pakistan meanwhile kept feeding the media with inanities and blatant lies like describing Maulana Azhar Masood, the chief of Jaish-e-Muhammad, who was released after the hijacking of IA/814 at Kandhar, as a religious leader, (Maj. Gen. Rashid Qureshi - spokesman of President of Pakistan). Pak Media spinners also kept hopes of an Agra Declaration alive till the last hoping to repeat Tashkent and Shimla.
Whatever, little hope was there of something emerging was set
at rest by the statements of Gen. Musharraf at a breakfast meeting with the Indian editors (both print and visual) at Agra on July 16, in the midst of summit discussions. In this unprecedented meeting telecast by PTV live and later by Star TV, the General made following points:(a) Kashmir is the main issue and India must recognise this reality before we can move forward on other issues,
(b) Kashmir has to be addressed in a structured framework within a time frame,
(c) people of Kashmir had to be involved in the dialogue process some time or other,
(d) the Kashmir issue had to be resolved in terms٥杶+e{7ۉ^bWnrn(+^qzuMŢuק qzkqz|ӝvǧnrf8^]x-جi^1"zwe뢺Zzv)ඇbxĈݗ'jZuا ƛ K 'v\+ Nib hv+nWH,~rz讖y8^]x-جi^1"zwe뢺Zzv)ඇbxĈݗ'j٥杶+e{7ۉ^bWnrn(+^qzuMŢuק qzkqz|ӝvǧnrf8^]x-جi^1"zwe뢺Zzv)ඇbxĈݗ'jZuا ƛ K 'v\+ Nib hv+nWH,~rz讖y8^]x-جi^1"zwe뢺Zzv)ඇbxĈݗ'j٥杶+e{7ۉ^bWnrn(+^qzuMŢuק qzkqz|ӝvǧnrf8^]x-جi^1"zwe뢺Zzv)ඇbxĈݗ'jZuا ƛ K 'v\+ Nib hv+nWH,~rz讖y8^]x-جi^1"zwe뢺Zzv)ඇbxĈݗ'j