Pakistan waged four wars with India in last 50 years and was a loser each time. 1965 war was a national disaster for Pakistan according to Air Marshal Nur Khan and Altaf Gauhar. The story of 1971 war is well known. According to Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan suffered heavier casualties in its Kargil misadventure than in the entire 1965 conflict. But the average Pakistani is informed otherwise, and the lie moulds their attitude towards India.

Vajpeyi, after repeated denials, ultimately, invited Parvez Musharraf for talk; he took several confidence building measures. He ordered the release of 229 Pakistani fishermen from Indian jails and the non-arrest of fishermen of that country straying in Indian waters, but 196 Indian fishermen continue to languish in the jails of Pakistan. There was not only no response from Pakistan to the confidence building measures from this side but even the positive measures on visas and scholarships were viewed as a distraction. Vajpeyi failed to understand Pakistani mind. His actions, like the earlier ones - of cease-fire, attempt to talk with Hurriyat and others - were taken as signs of Indian weakness. May be he was sending signals to the international community. But, these positive gestures had no meaning for Pakistan. Vajpeyi should not have hoped to succeed where Gandhi failed.

The summit started in the background of one-sided confidence building measures and concessions, the media-hype and the hope generated without any valid reason. The General came for peace, but the Pakistani guns continued to boom on the line of control, the cross-border terrorist violence continued unabated, the General continued to have rigid stand and the "Kashmir and the only Kashmir" agenda. He wanted focus only on Kashmir and the same to be recognized as a �dispute�, or at least as an �issue�. Prime Minister Vajpeyi insisted on composite dialogue.

There is basic difference even on Kashmir between the two countries. As far as India is concerned, the state of Jammu & Kashmir is its integral part. The legality of the State�s accession to India is unquestionable. For Pakistan, Kashmir is the part of the �unfinished agenda� of Partition. For India, it is not the Kashmir, but the cross-border terrorism, Pakistani aggression and the PoK, which form the core of the dispute. Any compromise on these issues shall amount to compromise on its principle of secularism. There was practically, no meeting point between the stand of the two countries.

The Indian media failed to educate the Indians on real issue. It chased sensation and failed there also. There was hardly any mention of almost 50% of the area of the State occupied by Pakistan and its part handed over to China. The media failed to project the views of the Jammu, Laddakh, Shias, Bakarwals, Gujjars, Pandits, and sober sections of the Sunnis of the valley. Hurriyat got disproportionate coverage. By and large, the Indian media remained Pakistan sympathetic. Again, there was virtual take over of our media by all sorts of Pakistanis with all sort of formulas and prescriptions; at a time threatening, at a time luring, and then admonishing to show a little flexibility. Musharraf was a hero for the sensation- hungry Indian media. His mere presence, even his wardrobe, mesmerized the journalists. It was surprising that none of the senior editors raised questions on the impertinent utterances of the Pakistani dictator during the breakfast meet. After all, they never behave so tamely when they meet their own leaders. Perhaps, these were the reasons that Musharraf praised Indian media for fairness and Pakistani media for their patriotism. Next to Pakistanis, Track II got undue coverage. Both combined to weaken Indian stand.

Track II activists and the leftists came out frequently with the myths and lies, which confused Indians. Money is openly asked and received in rallies in Pakistan by terrorists for purchasing bullets. But; they tell this side that �the people of both the countries want peace�. "Development Deficit, India, Pak in the same leaky Boat", "Indo-Pak problem same as Indo-Bangla, Indo-Nepali, Indo-Shrilanka problem", "South Asian seat in Security Council" "the human rights situation in both India and Pakistan" highlighted parity myths and confused the Indians. Concern for Tada by the persons with no concern for terrorism sounded strange. There were attempts to justify Pakistan inspired violence and hatred. A prominent journalist discovered the �cycle of hatred�. And the fact that �Pakistani hate feeds on Indian hate�. Perhaps, the hype and hope �was not without basis� for the Indian media.

Musharraf praised Vajpeyi, admonished religious extremists not to talk irresponsibly against India; he also talked about �flexibility� and open �mindedness�. He, at the same time, had repeated invocation for �jihad� and openly expressed his scant regard for agreements made by his country. The �architect of Kargil� defended Kargil. For him, Kargil was an answer to Shiachin and Kashmir terrorism to that of the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan. There was inconsistency in his statements. He was sending diverse signals. He was simultaneously addressing diverse groups - to Mullahs in Pakistani army, to Talibanized clerics, to India and the international community. Being an Urdu speaking Mohajir and a self-appointed president, his position was weak. His playing to the galleries was, mainly, aimed at strengthening his position and for attaining greater acceptability at the home front. This was necessary in a country that defines itself in anti-Hindu, anti-Indian, medieval and theological parameters based on ruthless negation of its own pre-Islamic past. Musharraf has the same mindset as his predecessors had.

What tempts Pakistan on the path of confrontation inspite of repeated defeat and huge socio-economic costs? The main factors seem to be (i) multiple inner weaknesses of India, and (ii) the myths and lies guiding Pakistani action.

Indian diplomacy failed from the very beginning in case of Kashmir. Pakistan took full advantage of the cold war situation; the Americans, the British and the Chinese supported.them. They managed to receive Chinese nuclear bomb and the missile technology. India failed even to neutralize the USSR�s pressure at Tashkent. The American think-tank on Kashmir sided with Pakistan. Owen Dixon wanted Kashmir valley to go to Pakistan. Chenab plan was, practically the replica of Dixon plan, and the basis of both was the "Two Nation Theory". The recent Autonomy Plan of the state is structured more or less on communal lines and does not differ much from the Dixon and Chenab plans.

The country used to develop cold feet, whenever Pakistan raised Kashmir and the human rights issue at any International fora. Its propaganda machinery remained always weak. Indian leaders took wrong steps many times due to their failure to read the Pakistani mind correctly. The recent Indian positive actions sent wrong signals across the border. Pakistanis, in general, and terrorist in particular, took it as a sign of Indian weakness and interpreted that the Indian leadership and Army is tired of the terrorists, that the battle-fatigued Indian army has pressurised Indian Prime Minister for the summit, and, that the Indians were pressurised by the Americans for the summit. This line of thinking is in conformity with the Pakistanis� belief in the myth, that Indians, particularly Hindus, are cowards that they are incapable of tolerating suffering for long. And so, Pakistan�s line of thinking runs along this: if they persist in exporting terrorism from across the boarder, Indian public opinion will make the rulers surrender Kashmir. But this is a myth created by the British, strengthened by the Indian left and believed by the.Gandhians. It motivates and encourages the Pakistanis for Jehadi action.

The greatest source of the Indian weakness, in this case, is its compromised stand on secularism. J&K was given special status. But why? Because, it is a Muslim majority state. Why article 371? Why a Muslim majority state needs special status in the secular polity? Clearly, it was a case of ideological inconsistency. The country compromised its secular principles in Kashmir. This amounted to double talk and hypocrisy. It weakened our stand on secularism as well on Kashmir.

Sheikh Abdullah ensured non-participation of Jammu in the Constitution making process of the State. The elections were rigged. He separated Doda from Udhampur and Kargil from Laddakh. It was the divide based on communal considerations. For Nehru, Sheikh was Kashmir. This created problem for the country. Nehru was wrong. Congress-National Front combine rigged elections in Kashmir. All these did not have healthy impact on the internal situation of the�٥�杶+e{�7�ۉ�^��b�W���n�rn(����+^q��z�u�MŢ��uק�q��z�kq��z���|ӝv�ǧ���n�r�f�8^��]�x-�جi�^1"���zwe��뢺Z���z��v)ඇb���xĈ���ݗ'����j���Zuا���ƛ�� K�'�v\���+��N�i�b�hv+nW�H�,~����rz�讖�y8^��]�x-�جi�^1"���zwe��뢺Z���z��v)ඇb���xĈ���ݗ'����j�٥�杶+e{�7�ۉ�^��b�W���n�rn(����+^q��z�u�MŢ��uק�q��z�kq��z���|ӝv�ǧ���n�r�f�8^��]�x-�جi�^1"���zwe��뢺Z���z��v)ඇb���xĈ���ݗ'����j���Zuا���ƛ�� K�'�v\���+��N�i�b�hv+nW�H�,~����rz�讖�y8^��]�x-�جi�^1"���zwe��뢺Z���z��v)ඇb���xĈ���ݗ'����j