Dialogue  July - September, 2003 , Volume 5  No. 1

The ASEAN Regional Forum and the Challenges of Managing Asia-Pacific Security
Joseph M. Fernando

Abstract

The formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 was intended to broaden to the Asia-Pacific region Asean’s approach to cooperative security amid the emerging uncertainties in the region. With the end of the Cold War and the impending withdrawal of the United States from Southeast Asia, states in the region saw a need for a wider regional organization which could promote international peace and security while engaging the regional powers, in particular China and Japan, in a security dialogue. Almost nine years on, the ARF as a loose consultative organization for security dialogue and cooperation is still evolving. This essay seeks to examine the development of the ARF and assess its role as a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation. It will be argued that while the ARF is making slow and measured progress, the forum remains an important mechanism for managing regional security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Introduction

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) continues to attract global attention as a desirable mechanism for discussion of multilateral security issues in the post-Cold War era. The diversity of its membership and broad geographical span makes it a unique and attractive multilateral security organization amid the emerging uncertainties of the post-Cold War era. The ARF, in this era of renewed interest in regionalism as a means of promoting peace and security, is the only forum of its kind that brings together all the major powers as dialogue partners. Anchored by the much older regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the forum has been able to co-opt even Cold War adversaries. More importantly, in its brief history the organization has made significant measured strides in raising the level and framework of discussion of security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The forum is still evolving and taking shape but there is a growing awareness among its membership that the ARF holds much potential of developing into a dynamic regional security organization. This essay examines and analyses the role of the ARF as a multilateral forum for security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The first part of this essay will trace the origin of the ARF to discern the rationale for the formation of the organization. The second part will examine the development and achievements of this forum over the last nine years. And the third section will discuss the limitations of the organization as a mechanism for enhancing regional security. This essay will argue that while the ARF is making slow and measured progress, the forum remains an important mechanism for managing regional security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Origin of the ARF

The ASEAN Regional Forum emerged amid the changing security scenario in the Asia-Pacific region following the end of the Cold War.The breakdown of the more predictable balance of power between the United States and Soviet Union and their allies created new uncertainties, particularly in Southeast Asia. The US announcement in November 1991 of its plan to withdraw from the Philippines and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of that year greatly influenced ASEAN thinking. The ASEAN states viewed this development with much concern, particularly in the context of the influence of the emerging regional powers, China and Japan. They felt there was a need to engage these regional powers in a broader security forum to enhance regional security. As the former secretary-general of ASEAN, Rodolfo C. Severino, has noted:

The end of the Cold War and the events leading to it dissolved the regional security configuration in East Asia, with nothing to replace it.  With formal alliances losing their old prominence, East Asia and the Pacific, at the very least, needed a forum in which to talk about regional security issues in the new situation and, after years of conflict and mutual suspicion, build confidence among the countries of the region and other powers with interests in it. Responding to this need, ASEAN, in 1994, gathered into what it called the ASEAN Regional Forum its then Dialogue Partners – Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United States – its observer Papua New Guinea, its future Dialogue Partners, China and Russia, and later, as it became another Dialogue Partner, India, and finally Mongolia and North Korea.

The fourth summit of the ASEAN heads of governments in Singapore in 1992 took up this theme as one of their main points of discussion. The ensuing Singapore Declaration stated: “Having reviewed the profound international political and economic changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and considered their implications for ASEAN, we declare that “… ASEAN shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity.”The ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in 1993, following indication of support from its dialogue partners and in particular the United States, agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum. The communiqué issued after the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in 1994 further confirms the rationale for the formation of the forum. 

Ralf Emmers has suggested that “balance of power” consideration, in particular a denial of potential Chinese hegemony, was a key factor in the establishment of the ARF. This element is certainly an important consideration. But the predominant motive was the felt need in ASEAN for a wider cooperative security organization that could include all the major players in the region and one that could address the strategic and political realities of the post-Cold War security scenario. As the first ARF meeting stressed, there was “… a need to develop a more predictable constructive pattern of relationships for the Asia-Pacific region.” ASEAN leaders indicated at the time that the continuing presence of the United States and a stable relationship with the other regional powers such as China, Japan and other states in the region was essential to enhance regional security. The intentions of the founder members were clearly much broader.

Eighteen nations attended the first meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994.  The objectives of the ARF as stated by the chairman were, firstly, to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and, secondly, to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. The meeting, chaired by the Thai foreign minister, agreed to convene the ARF on an annual basis.  Interestingly, the meeting also endorsed the principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a potential “code of conduct” governing relations between the member states. In doing so, ASEAN was recognized as the primary driving force behind the ARF. ASEAN was effectively given control of the pace and direction of ARF’s development, including agenda-setting powers.

A concept paper outlining the nature of the organization and adopted at the second ARF meeting in 1995 in Brunei, identified a carefully crafted “gradual evolutionary” approach for the organization. This evolution was to take place in three stages: the first, promotion of confidence-building measures; the second, development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms; and the third, development of conflict-resolution mechanisms. The participants agreed that in the initial phase, the ARF should concentrate on enhancing, the trust and confidence among the participants and foster a regional environment conducive to maintaining the peace and prosperity of the region.

The main mechanism for the ARF is the annual senior officers meeting and the annual foreign ministers meeting. The concept paper suggested two approaches in promoting the initial phase of confidence-building measures. The first is ASEAN’s established practices of consultation and consensus (musyawarah and muafakat) which it was felt would develop trust and confidence among the states. The second approach is the implementation of concrete confidence-building measures. It was also suggested that the ARF process should proceed along two tracks, Track One activities that will be carried out by government officials and Track Two activities to be carried out by strategic institutes and non-governmental organizations.

It was not until the third meeting in 1996 that the ARF drew up the criteria for membership of the organization. The ARF would only admit participants “that can directly affect the peace and security of the region on which the ARF shall focus its peace-building and peace-making efforts.”  It was also at this meeting that the ARF sought to identify a “geographical footprint” in terms of membership, covering Northeast and Southeast as well as Oceania. There was consensus that the ARF should not expand the geographical scope and that it should “expand carefully and cautiously.”  This cautious approach was a reflection of the founders’ political pragmatism. The participants were fully aware of the diverse and complex mix of the membership and the need to focus on confidence building. Hence the reiteration at almost every ARF meeting that the forum should continue to progress “at a pace comfortable to all” and the emphasis on decision-making by consensus. ASEAN’s experience in confidence-building over a longer period of time in this sense was an important reference point. There was some concern that a faster pace could place unnecessary pressure on some members and could lead to their withdrawal.

Development of the ARF, 1994-2003

In the almost nine years of its existence, the ARF has undergone a slow but steady maturing process without raising unrealistic expectations. The scope of the security dialogue has broadened extensively in terms of the range of discussions each year. From discussion of confidence building measures and peacekeeping in the early years, the organization has initiated important discussions on terrorism, management of territorial disputes and the security implications of globalization. The Track II activities have also increased in complexity from exploratory studies in confidence building and peacekeeping cooperation to more specific policy-oriented and capacity building projects.

At the second ARF meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan on 1 August 1995, for example, an Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on confidence building measures, chaired by Indonesia and Japan was set up. Malaysia and Canada were tasked to chair the Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) on peacekeeping operations while Singapore organized a seminar on search and rescue coordination and cooperation. The guidelines governing the organizing of ISGs and ISMs were also outlined at this meeting.

The third ARF meeting in Jakarta on 23 July 1996 reached consensus on the criteria for membership, following some concern among the membership that the organization could become unwieldy if not properly managed. It was agreed that the ARF “should only admit participants that can directly affect the peace and security of the region.”  Essentially, the “geographical footprint” for ARF membership and key activities was limited to all of East Asia, (both Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia) and Oceania. The chair noted the ARF should only expand carefully and cautiously: “As the ARF is barely three years old, it would be advisable to consolidate the ARF process before expanding it rapidly. Each new participant must be admitted on the firm understanding that its participation is necessary for the ARF to accomplish its key goals.” It was also agreed that all new participants should be sovereign states, effectively shutting out Taiwan. India and Myanmar became the new members of the ARF at this meeting.

What is perhaps clearly evident at this stage is that with each progressive year there were more frank and substantive discussion of issues of common concern which ranged from peacekeeping cooperation to nuclear non-proliferation to maritime security issues, and extending more recently to discussion of non-military issues such as globalization. The organization nevertheless emphasised at almost every forum the importance of the “evolutionary approach” to the three-stage development. Confidence building, the ARF reiterated repeatedly, was the primary goal of the organization and decisions should be reached through consensus. The fifth ARF meeting stressed the need to address security issues in a comprehensive manner, inclusive of non-military issues, thus expanding the scope of the forum.

At the sixth ARF meeting in Singapore on 26 July 1999, there appears to be some concern on the future directions of ARF. Some members obviously felt that the process was moving too slowly. Hence the ministers noted that there was a need to build on the strong foundations and “to move the process forward so that the ARF would continue to remain relevant and able to respond to the challenges posed by the changing political and security environment.” These sentiments were probably related to the slow recovery from the Asian financial crisis and the lack of new initiatives from the forum around this time. The ministers urged the ARF to pay closer attention to the security implications of the economic crisis while stressing that “cooperative regional arrangements had played an important role in containing the effects of the crisis.”

The sixth ARF meeting also noted the usefulness of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a key instrument for strengthening regional security, the communiqué adding that the non-ASEAN states were considering acceding to the TAC.20  For ASEAN, getting the ARF members to seriously consider acceding to the TAC as a region-wide code of conduct was an important